

Social Order

DIPLOMACY TODAY
Kurt von Schuschnigg

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AMERICAN CATHOLICS AND INTERNATIONAL LIFE

Thomas F. O'Dea

✱ Robert J. Dwyer

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BOOKS • LETTERS • COMMENT

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. . . just a few things

THE SOCIOLOGICAL CAUSES of the political provincialism of all too many American Catholics facing the fact of other nations are explained on another page of this issue by Professor Thomas F. O'Dea. The explanation is not intended as a justification. Such "askewness" represented a rude forgetfulness of the intellectual and spiritual patrimony of Catholic universalism. Happily, this inadequacy is being overcome. For example, during the coming year every lay organization in the Diocese of Oklahoma City and Tulsa, scarcely a crossroads of the world, will concentrate its study and action programs on a common project concerning international life. Several dioceses are making provision in their high school curricula for a study of the Foreign Policy Association's "Great Decisions" program. Indeed, Professor O'Dea's article is an adaptation and an amplification of one of the background papers prepared for a two-day informal colloquium, sponsored last January by the Foreign Policy Association—World Affairs Center, looking to enlarge the interest of American Catholics in international affairs. Contributing to the fruitful discussion were two bishops, several monsignori and a distinguished list of Catholic educators and editors from all over the country.

The concept of universalism is at the basis of the patrimony of revealed truth. There is the fact of the common origin, of the common nature and of the common destiny of all men. "God made all men of one blood to dwell upon the face of the earth," announced St. Paul,

thus damning all racism and all selfish nationalism. It is mankind that is redeemed in the single sacrifice of the cross, as it is all mankind who stands in need of divine help, as it is all mankind which is invited to the new life of grace mediated by Christ's Church.

It would be a juvenile error, of course, to conclude that these facts of the supernatural solidarity of all men demonstrate the cogency of the case for World Federalism. Such naive exuberance would parallel that of the civic reformers of the turn of the century who saw the meaning of religion exhausted in the multiplication of playgrounds, enlightened prison administration, tenement improvement and national Prohibition. The ultimate unified international community, as the Christian Faith teaches, will be realized at the end of time. Nevertheless, transcendent though our Faith be, it has inescapable temporal consequences. Its assertion that in the Christian perspective there is neither slave nor free, neither Jew nor Gentile, neither Greek nor barbarian is challenged when, through collective cowardice, the township of suburban Deerfield, Illinois, votes a bond issue to turn into a public park (hitherto unneeded) a projected subdivision of \$30,000-\$40,000 homes because 20 per cent of the sales were reserved to Negroes. Similarly, despite conflicting ideologies and conflicting national interests, there is emerging, tentatively and obscurely to be sure, a common realization of a world community, an outline, a reflection, a prefiguration in the temporal order of that

hidden collectivity of redeemed humanity that will be made manifest at the end of time.

To a degree never adequately reflected in the American Catholic press, these gropings toward an international order, juridically organized, have had the continuous and effective support of the Papacy. In the allocution which was unsparing in its strictures on the failure of the United Nations to come to the aid of Hungary when its short-lived freedom was brutally crushed by the Soviets, Pope Pius XII carefully included an explicit endorsement of the international organization itself. The UN's Specialized Agencies, being non-political, are of particular interest to the Holy See which has permanent observers at FAO, at UNESCO and at the ILO. Nowhere was the mind of the Holy See on this subject made more clear than in the audience granted by Pope Pius XII to the XIth Congress of the International Movement of Catholic Intellectuals at Easter, 1957, when delegates of 64 organizations affiliated to Pax Romana met at Rome to discuss the theme, "The Catholic Intellectual at the Service of the Coming World Community."

Having sketched the plan of Divine Providence for mankind, the Holy Father declared:

A Christian, then, cannot remain indifferent before the evolution of civilization. If he sees an international community taking form under the pressure of historical events, he knows that this unification, willed by the Creator, must eventuate in an union of minds and of hearts in the same faith and the same love. The Christian not only may but must work for the coming of this community which is still inchoate; for the example and the command of his Divine Master constitute for him a guide and a grace. All men are

his brothers not only in virtue of the unity of their origin and their nature but, in a fashion still more acute, in their common vocation to the supernatural life.

Is this to make all concern for world peace and for international social justice a function of a proselytizing purpose? Is the chosen instrument for achieving international unity to be the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda rather than the United Nations? Pius XII promptly answered:

Does this mean that one cannot collaborate in the interest of the world community in those institutions where God is not explicitly recognized as the Author and Ruler of the universe? It is important here to distinguish degrees of cooperation. Without forgetting that his ultimate purpose is to contribute to the eternal salvation of his brothers, the Christian will be mindful that the coming of the Kingdom of God in the hearts of men and in their social institutions demands most frequently a minimum of human development, a simple dictate of reason, which every man normally accepts, even if he has not the grace of faith.

The Christian should be ready, then, to work for the alleviation of all material miseries, for the universal development of basic education, in a word for all the undertakings directly envisaging the improvement of the lot of the poor and the disinherited, certain that in so doing they are fulfilling a duty of collective charity and are helping the greatest number of persons to reach a level of living worthy of the name and thus enabling them to join their efforts freely to the concourse of events which will lead them to a truer existence . . .

Such efforts, the late Holy Father knew, are not easy. Indeed, as he pointed out, they call inevitably for "the greatest abnegation".

But such a perspective provides rich insights in all discussions of technical assistance, foreign aid and, indeed, in all consideration of international affairs.

E. D. S.J.

American Catholics and International Life

THOMAS F. O'DEA

THE SIZE of the Catholic community¹ in America (39,509,508 in 1959), the social mobility of Catholics into upper-middle class status, and the urgency of the foreign policy issues facing the nation lend a new importance to a consideration of Catholic attitudes on foreign affairs. Involved in this question is that of Catholic participation in the kinds of organizations that provide the context of opinion formation concerning international relations. The present article is a tentative attempt to examine the strategic historical and sociological factors affecting these important problems. Its tentativeness should be stressed, for a more certain statement would require long and costly research.

We begin with two questions, one concerning Catholic participation in organizations concerned with foreign affairs discussion and education, of which the Foreign Policy Association is

pre-eminent, and the other respecting Catholic attitudes toward foreign policy itself. The first should be approached as part of the larger problem of Catholic participation in the organizations of American society generally. The second should be discussed in terms of the main factors that have affected the development of attitudes among Catholics concerning issues involved in or related to foreign policy.

The term "Catholic," however, raises difficulty to begin with. It is not a concise category permitting hard and fast generalizations. There are various sorts and conditions of Catholics in this country and general statements about them must be hedged with appropriate qualifications. Yet we persist in using the general term with some degree of accurate designation. Is its use justifiable in a broad analysis of this kind?

Such justification can be found if Catholics by and large have shared, in addition to their religious commitment,

¹ For most purposes it is probably not accurate to speak of one Catholic community in this country. There is, however, a sense in which such a usage is justified in the present case as we shall suggest in our discussion below of what we shall designate as the "American Catholic Experience."

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a similar challenge in America. Are there characteristic elements or dimensions in the diverse experiences of heterogeneous Catholics in this country which, despite their varied circumstances of life, may be subsumed under the same categories of analysis without serious distortion of their different histories? Is there in fact a recognizable historical and sociological entity which might fairly be called the "American Catholic Experience?"

We shall assume here that there is, an assumption we shall not digress to demonstrate, though we believe it quite demonstrable, and we shall assert that it has had quite recognizable results. These have affected the mentality of Catholic Americans in ways which we shall analyze. Such a conception is, of course, a very approximate delineation of a complex and variegated historical reality, and conclusions based upon it will necessarily be very approximate ones.

The American Catholic experience

The great background fact descriptive of the American Catholic Experience is the fact of mass immigration. From 1820 to 1930, 37,762,012 immigrants came to the United States, 32,276,346 of them coming from Europe. From the foundation of the Republic to 1820, about 250,000 newcomers came, at a rate of five to six thousand a year. In the 1820s the numbers began to increase; in the late 1840s mass immigration really commenced, with the arrival of the Irish and the Germans in large numbers. In the 124 years from 1820 to 1943, some 6 million Germans and 4,600,000 Irish

came, the latter making up 70 per cent of the immigration from the British Isles in the years from 1821 to 1860. The arrival of these two nationalities brought an increasing proportion of Catholics to America, since about 40 per cent of the Germans were Catholic and of the Irish about four million were Catholic, the large Scotch-Irish immigration having by and large occurred earlier.

The so-called "New Immigration" from southern and eastern Europe, which began in the 1880s, brought new and diverse peoples to these shores, constituting in the decade of 1901-1910 72 per cent of all immigration. It consisted of Poles, Magyars, Italians and others, some two million Italians arriving in the decade 1901-1910 alone. Of these "new immigrants," many were Catholic; as a result the Catholic Church in America grew from seven million to 16 million from 1890 to 1916. In terms of Catholic assimilation, however, these new groups were generally fitted into a mode of adaptation and a church structure that was the product of earlier Irish and German experience. With the great migrations of the Irish and Germans which began in the late 1840s mass Catholicism in America commences and with it the American Catholic Experience enters a new and decisive phase.²

The culture and society into which these new arrivals came was dominantly Protestant. This was true numerically, culturally and with respect to domi-

² Much has been written on immigration. See, for example, Marcus Lee Hansen, *The Atlantic Migration*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1951, and Oscar Handlin, *Boston's Immigrants, 1790-1865*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1941.

nance in social, political, economic and intellectual life. The social system of 19th century America rested upon the twin pillars of Protestant religion and Anglo-Saxon law. It was dominated by descendants of earlier arrivals who were chiefly Protestants of English ancestry, or similar groups assimilated to them. Throughout the century, America was, to use a waggish term, a WASP enterprise—white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant.

A WASP enterprise

Although the second half of the 19th century witnessed a marked secularization of life and thought, this process proceeded upon the established Protestant foundations, and showed many cultural marks derived therefrom. Moreover, Protestantism remained strong; on the eve of the Great War there were some 26,000,000 Protestant church members in this country to about 16,000,000 Roman Catholics. The victory of the 18th Amendment a few years later demonstrated that Protestant influence could still be decisive. Just one generation ago, in 1930, André Siegfried could still characterize Protestantism as the "national religion" of the United States.

The arrival of Catholics in large numbers evoked a negative response that at times flared up in unconcealed hostility. Nativism in the form of Know-Nothingism gave vent to violent local reactions in what has been called a "Protestant Crusade;" it appeared again in the second half of the century in the American Protective Association.³

³ See Ray Allen Billington, *The Protestant Crusade, 1800-1860, A Study of the Origins of American Nativism*. Macmillan, New York, 1938.

More restrained misgivings about the newcomers characterized less overt reactions. Fitting a large body of foreign Catholics into a Protestant country would not be easy.

The coming of large numbers of Catholics into a Protestant society and culture raised problems on two levels. First, there was the problem for the Church *qua* Church: how shall the Catholic Church adapt itself to its new situation? And, second, there was raised the question: how shall Catholic individuals and Catholic groups become assimilated to this new society in which from now on their destiny would lie?

America, especially in the post-Civil War period, did not permit as a long-run solution that kind of pluralism which is characterized by the coexistence of separate groups, each with its own language, culture and social forms, maintaining its peculiar identity within a loosely confederated society. America would permit ethnic ghettos, and even make them necessary, but their long-run significance was to serve as spatial and temporal zones of transition to full assimilation. At an earlier time there had been such cultural isolation for small sectarian groups, but its effect upon American society was not long lasting, and the pressures were always against anything like realization of what might be called the "Swiss model."⁴ Such groups as survive today, Amish, Hutterites, etc., appear to be

⁴ For an interesting article on quite different European solutions to the problems of religious pluralism, and the different point of view they engender, see Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, "A European View: Church-State Relations" in *The Commonwealth*, LXXI (November 27, 1959), pp. 255-8. For an American Catholic comment see the editorial in the same issue, "Church and State," pp. 251-2.

only bizarre exceptions proving the rule. Even as early as the 1830s de Tocqueville testified to the strong pressures for uniformity in the young republic. The most dramatic example of religiously based semi-separatism in our history, that of the Mormons, issued eventually in accommodation and assimilation to the general culture in most essential respects.

Problem for the Church

How, in these circumstances, should the Church *qua* Church meet the challenge of living in America? This question soon arose in diverse forms and for many decades became the focus of controversy—often enough intemperate—within American Catholic life, as adaptationists and the apostles of aloofness contested with each other on issue after issue. How should the Church regard Protestantism? What should its attitude be toward the non-Catholic American state? Should immigrant Catholics and their offspring become culturally like their non-Catholic fellow citizens? How should the education of Catholics be conducted? What about the relation between energetic, activist American values and Catholic values which gave primacy to contemplation? These were some of the issues confronting the immigrant Church as it began its career of relating itself to the realities and possibilities of America. In short, should the Catholic Church become Americanized?

To oversimplify a complex development, it may be said that the struggle tended to divide on ethnic lines. The Irish generally said "yes"; the Germans generally said "no." To the former, with a background of oppression in

Europe, American utopianism always made a telling appeal. For the latter, the preservation of German cultural identity, including the German language, seemed the most desirable, and indeed the only, context for protecting the faith of German immigrants. Out of this encounter of Catholicism and America, and this conflict among Catholics, what emerged was an Americanized Catholicism and an American Catholic Church.⁶ The victory was not by any means a demolishing of opposite views or a disestablishing of nationality-based Catholic organizations. The Americanization process, moreover, left a heritage of difficulties. Yet the genuineness of the accomplishment is beyond doubt. Indeed the Catholic Church became an effective Americanizing force, offering to the descendants of immigrants a reference group rooted in the past but not simply of ethnic significance. The Catholic Church in America has itself "been a 'melting pot.'" Moreover, it has culturally become quite American. If "Americanism" is indeed a "phantom heresy,"⁷ there is nothing ethereal about such Catholic adaptations to business life as the Serra Clubs.⁷ Further, the

⁶ For two books, published in the last decade, important to this subject, see Robert D. Cross, *The Emergence of Liberal Catholicism in America*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1958 and Colman J. Barry, O.S.B., *The Catholic Church and German Americans*. Bruce, Milwaukee, 1953.

⁷ See Abbe Felix Klein, *Americanism: A Phantom Heresy*. Aquin Book Shop, Atchison, Kansas, 1951, and Thomas T. McAvoy, C.S.C., "Americanism, Fact and Fiction," *Catholic Historical Review*, XXXI, (July, 1945), pp. 133-53.

⁷ For example, see Walter J. Ong, S.J., *Frontiers in American Catholicism*. Macmillan, New York, 1957, Chap. 2, "An Apostolate of the Business World," pp. 24-34.

adaptation of Catholics to political life has been one of phenomenal success. Despite a real lag in the intellectual sphere, here, too, genuine contributions are being made. To give but one example, there is no doubt that the writings of John Courtney Murray, S.J. on the theology of Church and State, based upon the lessons of the American Catholic Experience, are a significant contribution to Catholic thought generally.

The substantial victory of the "Americanizers" is attributable to three factors. The pressures of American life demanded it; the appeal of America to the Irish, who were strategic in Church councils, favored it; and the desire for social mobility by the immigrants or at least their descendants made it inevitable. Yet the experience had effects other than simply Americanizing the Church and aiding the assimilation of its members, although those two are of central significance. It left a mark upon Catholic attitudes and thinking which involved some disarticulation between Catholicism and the general culture of America. It precipitated psychological residues, often of an implicit and subtle kind, that would make difficult direct and unburdened *rapprochement* between Catholicism and many aspects of American life.

The Americanization of the Catholic Church, an historical phenomenon of great significance, should be viewed in the context of two other accomplishments, the remarkable growth of the Catholic population throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, and the brute fact of sheer survival. From 1790 to 1959, the population of the United States increased from a little under 4

million to 176 million or about 45 times. In the same years the membership of the Catholic Church grew from 35 thousand to almost 40 million, or about 1,142 times. Immigration was decisive in both cases but its relatively greater importance in the Catholic case is obvious. The Church faced massive assimilation problems and it is not surprising that considerable losses were incurred. A Catholic sociologist has recently suggested that without these losses the present Church membership in America would be from 50 million to 55 million.⁸ Yet the same writer states that it is astonishing that the actual losses were not greater. Survival, phenomenal growth and substantial Americanization are the accomplishments of American Catholicism in the past 170 years, a remarkable record. The figures suggest the scope of the problems that had to be faced.

Irony in accomplishments

These accomplishments of Catholicism in America were not without a certain irony. This irony can best be stated in terms of two sociological categories derived from the work of Ernst Troeltsch. The fundamental problem for Christianity, Troeltsch stated, is that involved in relating activity in the world to the transcendent call of the New Testament. As a consequence, there arise two social forms of Christian community. In this sense the "church" represents the effort at adaptation, the creative search for which is

⁸ Abbe Francois Houtart, *Aspects Sociologiques du Catholicisme Américain* Editions Ouvrières, Paris, 1957, p. 37. See also Gerald Shaughnessy, *Has The Immigrant Kept The Faith?* Macmillan, New York, 1925.

characteristic of every epoch. The "sect" embodies the attitude of rejection of "compromise" and a policy of withdrawal from, or militant opposition to, the world.⁹

The influential forms of Protestantism in early America often inclined in a sectarian direction both in terms of social organization and theology. For the Puritans of Salem and Boston and the Separatists of Plymouth, migration itself was a secession from Babylon. Yet the culture that issued from Protestant settlement became a Protestant culture, embodying Protestant values as the core consensus upon which American society came to rest. This fact remains true despite the secularization of the colonial period and of the decades after the Civil War. Consequently, Protestantism was able to make the kind of adaptation to secular life in America which bears important marks of what in Troeltsch's terms may be called a "church response." Despite the original sectarian elements in belief and polity, Protestantism became in fact the unofficially "established church" of the American Republic.

The classic example

Catholicism, on the other hand, has always offered the classical example of what Troeltsch meant by a church. Despite the defensive posture which, since 1517, history had forced upon it, the Catholic Church came to America with quite ecclesiastical orientations reflected both in its theology and its organizational forms, although its relative alienation from many aspects of

modern life certainly inhibited the realization of some of their implications. It is true to say that post-Tridentine Catholicism displayed many defensive characteristics in historical situations requiring defense. Coming to America as an immigrant Church entering a Protestant culture, it was forced to make its adaptation in ways that often required a defensive posture. Consequently, it was forced to behave in ways resembling a sectarian response.

Resulting separatism

As a result, Catholics set up in many spheres separate organizations as a context for Catholic life. These range today from the Catholic Boy Scout Troop to the Catholic Association for International Peace, from Catholic grammar schools to Catholic universities. Such a response was the result of a truly ecclesiastical effort to reconcile Christ and culture.¹⁰ But because of the defensive elements made necessary by the dominant Protestant milieu, it was an ecclesiastical response based upon ecclesiastical theological positions in which lurked inescapable sectarian consequences. It involved at least a relative withdrawal from Protestant and secular society and culture; at times it involved an element of militant opposition.

The great irony of American religious history is certainly that a relatively sectarian Protestantism developed in America an ecclesiastical adaptation to society and culture, while an ecclesiastical Catholicism was forced to display elements of sectarianism in its quite ecclesiastical efforts. The result of this

⁹ Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teachings Of The Christian Churches*, Olive Wyon, tr., Vol. I and II. Macmillan, London and New York, 1931.

¹⁰ I borrow this phrase from H. Richard Niebuhr, *Christ And Culture*. Scribner, New York, 1951, a book which continues the analysis of Troeltsch on this basic issue.

unintended sectarianism has been a certain askewness in the relation of Catholicism to dominant American ideas and values, and a certain relative aloofness with respect to Catholic participation in the general organizations of American life.

The elements of aloofness and askewness that came to characterize the relation of Catholicism to American culture and society were increased by the secularization of culture in the second half of the 19th century. Earlier in Europe, because of the concrete concatenation of historical factors that prevailed, Catholicism had made an unfortunate adaptation to the rise of modern science.¹¹ Consequently, in the post Civil War period, when science was making a tremendous impact upon America, this inherited disability reinforced locally generated tendencies toward askewness. Secularists of Protestant background often saw in Catholicism a mighty fortress of what they deemed Christian recalcitrance to scientific progress.¹² Although a secularized culture offered in some respects more tolerance to Catholicism, it could not but make difficult a creative dialogue on fundamental intellectual is-

ues. The generally lower-class composition of the immigrant Church (a theme we will examine later), by keeping Catholics out of intellectual pursuits would reinforce this element of disarticulation. As naturalism came to have a strategic influence upon American thought in the last third of the 19th century, Catholic ideas and Catholic values could not but come to appear to many as "obsolete" or "reactionary."¹³

Source of beneficent clericalism

A third element contributing to askewness in the relation of Catholicism to American culture was the class composition of the American Catholic population. We shall return to this in more detail in the next section, but suffice it to say here that it was such as to make clerical leadership more exclusive than would have had to be the case if upper and upper-middle class groups had been more heavily represented. Evelyn Waugh suggested several years ago that the trouble with American Catholicism was that it had no aristocracy to serve as a counterbalance to the clergy. The truth so well concealed behind this curious Anglicism is that the social structure of American Catholicism has militated against the rise of a lay intelligentsia sufficiently important to play the role of genuine lay leadership. Moreover, the attitudes of the clergy and the con-

¹¹An excellent account of what is in some respects the exemplary case, and one that shows the inadequacy of popular stereotypes, is given in Giorgio De Santillana, *The Crime of Galileo*, University of Chicago Press, 1955. But this is but one dramatic example.

¹²For example, see such a book as John W. Draper, *History Of The Conflict Between Religion And Science*, Appleton, New York, 1873, where we are told, "Roman Christianity and Science are recognized by their respective adherents as being absolutely incompatible." p. 303. Or about a generation later, Andrew Dickson White, *History Of The Warfare Of Science With Theology*, Appleton, New York, 1896, Vols. I and II. White saw theology as the enemy of both science and capitalism, the two unquestioned sources of progress.

¹³With respect to naturalism Merle Curti states, "The most striking fact in the intellectual history of the last third of the nineteenth century was the blow to the historic doctrine of supernaturalism by new developments in the biological and physical sciences." Merle Curti, *The Growth Of American Thought*. Harper, New York, 1943, Ch. XXI, p. 531.

crete expressions of lay initiative did not issue in happy results. Trusteeism was undoubtedly a genuine American lay Catholic response and showed the general American characteristics of a lack of restraint and a boisterousness suggesting irresponsibility. Yet had it been incorporated into the Church rather than having been crushed, it might well have provided one basis for responsible lay leadership in later decades. While the result preserved Catholic communal integrity, other consequences less fortunate were part of the price. A beneficent clericalism came to characterize American Catholic life resulting chiefly from the lower-class and ethnic composition of the laity and the issue of the Trusteeship struggles. These elements could not fail to strengthen the other pressures making for aloofness and askewness, since American Catholicism was thereby deprived of an experienced lay leadership capable of tackling the cultural and social problems in a creative fashion.

The question of how the Church *qua* Church would meet the challenge of American life was answered historically by a reaction that both Americanized Catholicism and, at the same time, produced a certain askewness in the relation between Catholicism and American culture and an aloofness with respect to Catholic participation in the general organizations of American life. What of the second problem: how shall individual Catholics and Catholic groups become assimilated to America?

It is important that the question be asked in this form and not in terms of differences between clerical and lay assimilation. Both priests and laymen are

members of the Church and both share in the problem of the Church *qua* Church, although the priest is more directly involved in a structural sense. Secondly, both priests and laymen share in civic responsibilities and in ethnic loyalties, political identities and regional allegiances, although the position of the priest in the ecclesiastical structure and his relative isolation from areas of lay life modify the effects of these memberships in his case. There is an old Irish rhyme that catches the essential sociological point here:

Is it leave gaiety
All to the laity
Or cannot the clergy be
Irishmen too?

The priest shared in the Americanizing experience both as member of the ecclesiastical organization and as a Catholic individual in a non-Catholic society, and most times as a member of an ethnic group.

Insofar as the individual Catholic is a Catholic, the three dimensions of the problem for the Church *qua* Church become a part of his individual problem. Insofar as Catholicism constitutes for him an important reference group, an identification basic to his own self-definition, the cultural and institutional problems facing the Church *qua* Church as matters of objective encounter, become for the individual Catholic matters of interior personal confrontation, of internal conflict or subjective ambivalence. Although they impinge upon him in most varied manner, these structured dimensions of the problem for the Church become elements of the individual's situation.

The second dimension of the indi-

vidual's problem concerns social status. Catholics came to this country quite generally at the bottom of the socioeconomic scale and had to begin the slow process of social mobility, one often requiring more than a single generation. As late as 1948, a century after the Irish Famine and the beginning of Catholic mass immigration, the Catholic Church in America still counted a greater proportion of its members in lower-class status than did either Protestantism or Judaism. In that year, 13.8 per cent of the Protestants, 21.8 per cent of the Jews and 8.7 per cent of the Catholics belonged to the upper class; 32.6 per cent of the Protestants, 32 per cent of the Jews and 24.7 per cent of the Catholics were reported as middle class; and 53 per cent of the Protestants, 46 per cent of the Jews and 66.6 per cent of the Catholics occupied lower-class status.¹⁴ Figures on educational attainment tell the same story.¹⁵

Lower-class groups will, obviously, have less influence in shaping the cultural ethos and in affecting national policy, at least in any direct sense, than groups more intellectually prepared and more strategically placed. Hence, class composition alone, because of the comparably larger lower-class percentage, will in the Catholic case make Catholic influence incommensurate with Catholic numbers. Hence, class status is a factor strengthening the tendencies toward askewness and aloof-

ness deriving from the other sources we have considered.

Class composition tended to keep Catholics out of those organizations which were decisive in policy formation and influence. The one important exception is labor. The labor movement has been the chief source of lower-class influence upon public policy, although it has not been the only one.



Catholics have long been important in labor, to the point that self-confessed experts who claim to know the Washington scene tell us that the position of Secretary of Labor is today a "Catholic job." It is significant for our subject that the position of Secretary of State definitely is not. The class structure of American Catholics is such as to keep them underrepresented in strategic policy influencing organizations, with the important exception of the trade unions. It is important to recall here that labor was not fully legitimated in American life until the New Deal, if indeed the backlog of middle-class opinion which ranges from suspicion to antagonism toward unions permits one to call its present position one of complete acceptance by the general community.

If lower-class status made the problem for the individual Catholic one

¹⁴Francois Houtart, *op. cit.*, p. 84. See also John J. Kane, *Catholic-Protestant Conflicts In America*, Chap. V, "The Social Structure of American Catholics," Regnery, Chicago, 1955, pp. 70-89.

¹⁵See Ernest Havemann and Patricia Salter West, *They Went to College*. Harcourt, New York, 1952, pp. 187-188.

of rising socially and economically, his European background soon placed him in a position that involved some break with ethnic identifications. Communities and organizations based upon nationality also tended to keep Catholics aloof from the main streams of American life. Nationality groups usually did not affect the development of foreign policy, except as pressure groups concentrating on issues immediately affecting the homeland.

Americanizing Catholicism

Let us recapitulate here. The adaptation of the Catholic Church to the dominantly Protestant situation in America was an empirical, adaptive accommodation that left the fundamental relation between Catholicism and American culture characterized by a certain askewness. Adaptation produced a genuinely American Catholicism, but one that was still quite Catholic, while the general American culture remained derived from Protestant roots, often Protestant in fact, and often secularized in a direction indifferent or even hostile to religious values. Such a setting was not one admitting a comfortable congruence with Catholic ideas and value conceptions. Moreover, separate Catholic cultural institutions and social organizations, the social composition of the Catholic population, and its ethnic backgrounds and loyalties, increased the askewness with respect to values and the aloofness with respect to participation. While the Americanization process was impressively successful, the structural basis of disarticulation and even conflict remained.

How has the American Catholic experience affected Catholic attitudes on issues involved in or related to foreign policy? It must be recalled that the encounter of an immigrant Catholicism and a native Protestant society and culture was also a process in which Irish and German newcomers confronted established Anglo-Saxon communities. Moreover, the Catholicism that came to this country had been affected by the experience of struggling for survival with actively hostile forces in Europe for almost three centuries; it was a Catholicism which reached the farthest point of its alienation from the modern world just about the time that mass Catholic immigration began in America. Further, the strategic bearers of its adaptationist response were Irish; they came with fresh memories of the disabilities affecting Catholics in an oppressed Catholic enclave in a Protestant kingdom.

The age of isms

Since the Act of Supremacy of 1534 declared that the Bishop of Rome had no more jurisdiction in the realm of England *quam alius externus Episcopus*,¹⁶ England and Catholicism faced each other as antagonists save for the few years of brief Marian interlude. Moreover, the 18th century was a time of rapid secularization of strategically important strata in English society, and the 19th century saw the rise of Liberalism, hostile to many basic Catholic positions. From 1848 onwards,

¹⁶The Act of Supremacy passed in the winter parliament of 1534 was of course in English, but the sixty-six bishops, abbots and others of the clerical Convocation whom we quote here repudiated Rome in Latin!

socialism became a force in Europe actively inimical to traditional Christianity. In the Latin countries, its advent was preceded by laicizing tendencies, which in the French Revolution took on extreme expression. With these developments Catholicism tended to become identified with conservative forces and ideas. This was in many ways an unfortunate alignment for the Church in the modern period, but one that proved unavoidable under the circumstances.

During the 19th century, England, once the protagonist of the Reformation, now increasingly secularized, showed considerable sympathy for liberal and revolutionary movements on the continent. Consequently, in the 19th century, a period dominated by England, Liberalism, and Science (with a capital S), the Church was far from at home in the world.

Important sections of American opinion were quite obviously affected by these current trends. While Americans tended to become sympathetic to European revolutionary movements, Catholic thought, traumatically affected by 1789 and 1848, tended to align itself with conservatism. The American public looked with sympathy on the Greek revolt against Turkey, the Hungarian uprising against Hapsburgs, and the seizure of Rome by the Italian Army. When Kossuth visited Washington in the early 1850s, he was welcomed by Daniel Webster, then Secretary of State, by the President and both Houses of Congress. The American populace generally received him with applause. "To leading Catholics like Bishop Hughes, Orestes A. Brownson, and the editor of the *Freeman's*

Journal, he was a fraud, a demagogue, and a foe of Christianity."¹⁷ When Napoleon III was overthrown, the United States recognized the Third Republic before 48 hours had lapsed; three years later official American opinion was friendly to the short-lived attempt to end the Spanish monarchy. Two American historians commented many years ago, "All this was true to form. Catholic influence in Washington had as yet reached no substantial proportions and in none of the revolutions was the principle of private property impugned."¹⁸

Conservative voice dominant

There were to be sure Catholic voices raised in the liberal direction—John Boyle O'Reilly was one—but the general Catholic tendency was toward conservatism. This frame of mind placed influential Catholics in a position of defense of—or to use a modern term, softness toward—slavery at a time when Northern opinion was shaping up in the opposite direction.

In the decades after 1861 the country was dominated by the Republican Party, then the American counterpart of European Liberalism, while the march of industrialism under the hegemony of the business class caused a widespread movement for reform in

¹⁷Quoted from Carl Wittke, *The Irish in America*, University of Louisiana Press, Baton Rouge, La., 1956, p. 185. Of course there were many Irish revolutionaries in America in this period, such as Thomas D'Arcy McGee, John Mitchel and Thomas F. Meagher. Meagher, for example, identified himself with the efforts of both Kossuth and Mazzini. And Irish immigrants contributed money to the causes of Irish reform and revolt.

¹⁸Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard, *The Rise Of American Civilization*. Macmillan, New York, 1930, Vol. II, pp. 363-4.

both rural and urban areas. American Catholicism rejected the currently popular identification of wealth and virtue;¹⁹ names like Terence Powderly and Ignatius Donnelly were not uncommon in movements for reform. While Catholics generally lined up with the Democrats and often enough with reform, Catholicism could not feel completely at home in association with either Liberalism with a capital L or liberalism with a lower case l. This fact remained true despite the numerous apparent exceptions, from Cardinal Gibbons' success in keeping Henry George off the *Index Librorum* to Archbishop Ireland's ardent Republicanism.

The Bishop's statement on social legislation in 1919 showed that Catholics recognized the need for reform measures. Within the Church Father John A. Ryan "fought conservatives in and outside the church, insisting that the responsibilities of Catholicism evolved with changing economic circumstances."²⁰ His effect was telling indeed as the Bishops' statement showed. Yet on the whole American Catholic thought remained derivatively conservative, and its reform impulses were based in most cases perhaps upon a conservative interest in social stability founded upon social justice. Obviously, the Catholic alignment on many important questions kept Catholics apart from current American liberal sympathies. Nowhere was this more the case than on those issues likely to be related to foreign events and developments.

Anti-British heritage

In the 19th century America prospered in safe isolation within an economic world system organized and dominated by London, and behind the protective shield of British naval supremacy. These facts were, however, far from salient in the minds of German and Irish Americans. The Irish made a strong identification with America, but they often were attracted to quite other aspects of the new land than those which elicited the loyalties of Anglo-Americans. The latter, especially perhaps in the urban East, and there among upper-class groups, tended to see as salient those aspects of American and English culture which bore a strong family resemblance. Protestant culture, parliamentary institutions, common law, and the bond of language and consanguinity stood out. The Irish were likely to give salience to those aspects of America which stood in sharp contrast to Irish experience with English rule and English institutions; republicanism as against monarchy, separation of church and state as against the Anglican Establishment, social mobility and egalitarianism as against a traditional status system and titles of nobility, and especially the anti-British heritage of 1776 and 1812.

"I've heard whispers of a country
that lies far beyond the say
Where rich and poor stand equal
in the light of freedom's day."

Washington had fought the English and was, moreover, an honorary member of the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick. Jefferson had indicted what both he and his Irish admirers considered the

¹⁹Irvin G. Wyllie, *The Self-Made Man In America. The Myth of Rags to Riches*. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, N. J., 1954.

²⁰Eric F. Goldman, *Rendezvous With Destiny*. Vintage, New York, 1956, p. 86.

enormity of British misrule. Jackson had beaten the English at New Orleans and was an Irishman to boot, a Scotch-Irishman of Ulster lineage, to be sure, but an Irishman for all that. Barry had founded the Navy. Such Irish American sentiments easily coalesced with strong sentimental identifications with the "ould sod." The Irish could not but join native Anglophobes in a little twisting of the lion's tail.

The German Catholics were, as we have seen, concerned with preserving German culture and tended to cling to German social forms. This tendency to remain German was not likely to make them share the attitudes and opinions of the old stock Anglo-Americans. Moreover, the Irish and Germans tended to resent Anglo-American attitudes in the local community. The feeling of the older groups that they were the "real Americans" appeared as arrogance and this could not but help keep alive immigrant attitudes brought over from Europe.



The end of the 19th century saw England and America draw together in foreign policies. This was to be seen in the Orient and in the British response to the Spanish American War. While the Kaiser saw the monarchical principle endangered in the first diplo-

matic difficulties between the United States and Spain in 1897, Britain's arch imperialist Joseph Chamberlain looked forward to seeing "the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack" waving together over an "Anglo-Saxon alliance." Henry Adams thought that "the sudden appearance of Germany as the grizzly terror" had "frightened England into America's arms" but, whatever the cause, the United States was unmistakably lining up with Great Britain against the new aggressively rising Germany. This was not a development likely to appeal to the Irish and German Americans, who were the dominant groups within the American Catholic Church. Mr. Dooley's comment apropos of "Hands across the Sea" that hot summer afternoon as he wiped off the top of his bar in his Archey Road establishment was to the point. "There are two kinds of hands, Hinnessy, pothry hands and rolling mill hands, and only one kind has anny votes." The rolling mill hands tended to turn hands down on hands across the sea.

In short, the conservatism of Catholic thought and the ethnic loyalties of the Irish and Germans, reinforced by their status in local American communities, tended to align Catholic sentiment against the basic line that was developing in American foreign relations. The American Catholic Experience did not prepare American Catholics on the whole to look with favor on a foreign policy friendly to Liberalism and revolution, Anglophile and, at the same time, antagonistic toward Germany. A tendency for Catholics to align themselves with isolationism was quite understandable under the

circumstances. Such an alignment often increased the other pressures toward askewness which we have discussed.

The role of religion

The role of religion in society, seen from the point of view of functional sociological theory, is to sanctify the values and norms strategic to the continuation of the social order, and to provide the ultimate grounding for a definition of man and his situation that renders human life meaningful and human effort worthwhile. Students of religion and culture such as Christopher Dawson and T. S. Eliot have emphasized this basic and central function of religion. While this is perfectly true, it is only half of the picture. With transcendent religions, at least, there is, as Troeltsch has made clear in the case of Christianity, a permanent tension between the demands of the transcendent call and the requirements of everyday life within the institutional forms of society. This is an abiding tension that cannot be exorcized without so seriously truncating religion as to amount to its actual corruption. This tension has often taken the concrete institutional expression of a conflict between church and state. Such cases, however, represent the effects of specific historical and sociological conditions which alter the fundamental disarticulation and involve many accidental elements, such as the inevitable collision of two authority structures in one society, power drives, vested interests, political alignments, etc. They should never be taken as models for our thinking, since by doing so we may absolutize the accidental features found

in the historically specific case. The basic tension is, however, inherent in the relation between a religion of transcendence and any society whatsoever. In so-called Catholic countries, the tension remains, often disguised in a confusing manner by the nominally Catholic aspect of social forms and institutions only questionably Catholic in content.

This inherent tension also has a definite function both for religion itself and for societies committed to certain kinds of values. It serves to keep up a degree of "healthy unadjustment" between religion and secular values and activities and, hence, to preserve the supramundane aspirations of religion itself. When this is missing, as in some historic Catholic situations, or in the *Kulturprotestantismus* of the last century, religion becomes merely an expression of the highest mundane values or a concealment for less admirable orientations and strivings.

Moreover, to a society and culture which places emphasis upon the dignity of the human person, this disarticulation, by underlining the centrality of the personal relation between God and the individual person, gives human worth an extra-societal foundation. It sets up a structured barrier against tendencies which define man as basically merely a segment of society and the group and, therefore, to be dominated by societal requirements in all fields of thought and action. Maritain has given us an excellent formulation of this aspect of the question in terms of a Catholic philosophy of man and society.

The Catholic Church which came to America as the Church of immigrants

was a church whose relation to this basic tension had been greatly exacerbated by the events of the preceding period. The hostility of modern developments to Christianity and the alignment of Catholic thought with conservative forces, together with the concrete historically conditioned formulation of many Catholic values, had converted the basic strain into a real askewness, one that involved other elements than the disarticulation between the call of Christianity and secular concerns. The problems of adaptation to America, despite their generally successful solution, further exaggerated this strain and bent the askewness toward alienation. There is no doubt that the elements of askewness we have seen characteristic of the relation of Catholicism to America derive from this basic built-in tension. It is also true, and most important to note, that the precise forms in which we have found them are largely the product of historically specific experiences; in their concrete forms they are in no way essentially involved in the Christian commitment.

Experience as frame of reference

There is, however, more than this to be considered. Experience shapes the attitudes of those who undergo it; the ideas and values, and the attitudes that embody them, once precipitated out of concrete historical situations, take on a certain relative autonomy. They are then transmitted to on-coming generations to become the frame of reference for the experience and interpretations of experience of these latter. What is involved here can best be seen, perhaps, by an analogy with social

processes studied in the sociology of knowledge and the sociology of work. For example, officials whose life experience is concerned with rational and established procedural methods of problem-solving often come to lose sight of the non-rational and chaotic elements characteristic of so much of human life. The training of perception and conceptualization in one direction leads to atrophy and dullness in others. As a result, we have the specialist, who is less capable of meeting problems outside his own sphere of competence than the ordinary intelligent layman. This common phenomenon was called "trained incapacity" by Veblen, "occupational psychosis" by Dewey, and "professional deformation" by Warnotte.²¹ Toynbee has shown that what is involved here is not simply limited to the individual sphere. Strategic elites, he argues, as a result of successful performance in meeting a challenge, not only change their objective situations, but also transform themselves in the process. As a result they are often rendered incapable of meeting a new challenge of a quite different character.²²

The aspect of this general problem most significant for us in the present context may be stated by saying that experience shapes individuals and groups but that it may shape them in ways which incapacitate them for meeting new life conditions. Moreover, this is complicated by an important psychological fact. Unsolved

²¹Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory And Social Structure*. The Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1949, pp. 151-160.

²²Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study Of History*, (Somervell abridgment). Oxford, New York and London, 1947, p. 307ff.

problems, unsolved wholly or in part, and elements of unresolved conflicts, remain as residues which affect apperception and associated tendencies toward action. This is true for individuals as clinical records abundantly testify. But groups also have an analogue of "memory" in the implicit and explicit mechanisms for the transmission of culture from one generation to the next. Hence the residues of aloofness and askewness left by the Americanization of the Church still exist in the shape of the "apperceptive mass"; it is in this context that Catholics see certain current problems and events and see them as structurally analogous to their original prototypes. All learning is of course a "recognition" of the new in terms of the old, but when the differences in the new situation are such that the old frame of reference inherited from the past distorts one's ability to grasp the new and thereby distorts understanding and miscues response, inadequacy and even complete inappropriateness of action ensue.

Church vs. isms

The experience of value conflict with modern trends of thought and with non-Catholic culture elements have produced some residues of this character in many American Catholics. Especially is this likely to be the case with respect to the conflict between Catholicism on the one side and such phenomena as Liberalism, secularism, and the various types of leftism on the other. Secondly, the experience of minority status which most Catholic groups have suffered has also left residues. These all make for tender spots

in Catholic sensitivities and defensiveness with respect to certain kinds of differences with other groups. Hence some issues have a symbolic significance in terms of prototypic experiences which trigger off these residues and make for responses ranging from not wholly adequate to quite inadequate in terms of the realities of current situations. "The fathers have eaten sour grapes and the teeth of the children are set on edge." (*Ez 18:12*)

The point to be stressed is that we are not arguing a specious historicism, but rather presenting an analysis of the past factors that live on in some psychological form in the present. Their form of survival is quite understandable in terms of well recognized psychological and sociological processes. Catholic reactions on many questions in intellectual fields, in public policy, and in problems involving values and ethics, often enough show these effects to one degree or another. This in no way implies that persons exhibiting such behavior have any explicit knowledge of the prototypic situations from which such responses ultimately derive.

The analysis we have presented so far must be complicated by consideration of another important factor, one whose strategic significance for our subject in the recent period can hardly be exaggerated. The victory of the October Revolution opened a new epoch in Western and world history. Tendencies in Western thought and social and intellectual movements that had developed throughout the previous centuries—secularism, scientism and socialism—coalesced to become the ideology of a new power structure, one

bent on aggressive efforts after world domination. Consequently, a new antagonist to the chief institutions of the West and one militantly anti-Christian in character emerged upon the stage of history.

A new catalyst: Communism

At the very point when this event occurred, the Catholic Church had just emerged out of the condition of extreme alienation from Western society and culture which had characterized its position in the mid-19th century. It had entered into a period of improved *rapprochement* with the secular world and at the same time showed signs of a new cultural vitality and creativity. The new challenge affected both its new-found external stability and its direction of development in relation to world issues.

Communism was indeed the incarnation of a specter that had been haunting Europe and threatening Catholicism since 1848. It was, moreover, reincarnation in altered form of trends in Western thought which had been in conflict with Catholicism for centuries. However, as the menace of communism became increasingly dangerous to the secular civilization of the West, a new sense of common origins, common values and common destiny, came to affect the attitudes of both Catholics and secularists. There developed a tendency to stand together against the common enemy. As an expression of old threats in new form, communism could not fail to increase the defensiveness and hence the askewness characterizing Catholic attitudes. Yet as the West more and more recognized

the danger of communism, a new solidarity became possible with non-Catholics, thus offering some alleviation of older elements of alienation.

The reflection of this change was soon visible in America. With the United States and the Soviet Union as the two opposing super powers, anti-communism tended to become an integral part of American patriotism. Thus the American Catholic found himself in a position where both his faith and his country faced the same threat. This offered him two kinds of "opportunity." By opposing communism vociferously the American Catholic could find a socially acceptable outlet for aggression generated by older conflicts, the disarticulation between Catholicism and the temper of modernity. After all, communism was a symbol and summation of such older elements in new aggressive form. By the same militant anti-communism, he could by the same token urgently identify himself with America and thereby seem to solve many of the unsolved problems of askewness and aloofness whose residues were still very much a part of his consciousness. Anti-communism thus became an occasion for a catharsis and an opportunity for identification with America.

In considering how Catholics in fact responded to this new opportunity, an important distinction should be borne in mind. Communism represents a real political and social phenomenon which constitutes a genuine threat to Christianity and to America and all free nations. As such, it should be realistically recognized and its dangers foreseen. Communism also serves as a highly visible foreign symbol of other

aspects of the modern situation, many of them of native genesis, aspects that can and often do exist in quite non-communist or anti-communist form. Secularism and modern atheism, scientific Prometheanism and its anti-religious implications, and social ideas and values which call in question the moral legitimacy and social efficacy of capitalism, all these exist and have long existed, separately and together, in the form of ideologies and movements in no sense communist. Yet the fact is that communism does represent one historical development of such tendencies. In this sense, communism is the product of the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment reform and revolutionary movements. Moreover, despite all the differences, one has often enough observed elective affinities between such tendencies and communism itself. It is this fact that was spotted and exploited to the hilt and beyond by the charges against certain liberals of being "soft on communism." Even where no real affinity or softness existed, the structural analogies permit a degree of symbolic identification to be made. Thus communism is capable of appearing as the surrogate for older ideas and movements and of triggering off reactions which express residues derived from older experiences with them. As a real national enemy, communism permits expression of aggression generated by these older frustrations against itself when the respectability and even the lack of visibility of the movements and ideas for which it serves as symbolic surrogate would make aggression difficult or embarrassing. Hence, communism is both a real enemy and a symbolic scapegoat.

In examining opposition to communism, it is necessary to distinguish between the reality content—communism as a real and dangerous political and military threat—and the symbolic content: communism as the symbol capable of reactivating older residues derived from older unresolved conflicts with ideologies and movements for which communism now stands as surrogate, and one that it is socially permissible to attack in the present circumstances.²³ And let us add, the symbol, aggression against which can be seen as a patriotic duty and an expression of one's identification with America.

Spanish Civil War

This new symbol and new fact became an integral part of the American scene in the 1930s, a decade marked by social reform and a leftward movement of thought in many circles. Unquestionably, the catalytic event was the Spanish Civil War. The attitudes of liberals generally was to offer apparent confirmation to the symbolic affinities which Catholics were prone to see as significant in the situation. Moreover, the old association of Spain with Catholic causes increased the symbolic appropriateness. This issue became the

²³Of course, response to the symbolic aspects of communism is not characteristic of conservative Catholics or conservative non-Catholics alone. Many liberals, too, offer an example of symbolic response in the other direction, or did until a few years ago. This response is a mirror image of the response we have been discussing here and just as inappropriate to reality. Thus some people could not react very strongly to the outrageously sham "trial" of Mindszenty in 1949. He was a Cardinal Priest of the Roman Church and hence by the "rules" of symbolic affinity necessarily a "reactionary."

focus for the crystallization of attitudes; once again Catholics were ranged on the opposite side from the rest of the American public generally.

On December 16, 1938, the Gallup Poll asked the question: Which side do you sympathize with in the Spanish civil war, the Loyalists or Franco? Of those in the national sample who had opinions, 76 per cent favored the Loyalists, while 24 per cent favored Franco. When we break down this figure in terms of religious affiliation, the picture was this: Protestants, pro-Loyalist 83 per cent; pro-Franco 17 per cent; Catholics, pro-Loyalist 42 per cent; pro-Franco 58 per cent.²⁴ While a majority of the sample did not favor lifting the embargo imposed under the Neutrality Act to send arms to the Loyalists, and were thus in agreement with dominant Catholic opinion on this point, yet the fundamental sympathies evoked by the war in Spain revealed startling differences between the state of opinion among Catholics and that of the nation generally. It is a striking expression of the kind of askewness we have been analyzing.

These figures are interesting for several reasons. They show the real askewness we have been concerned with. Secondly, they point up the reason why earlier we separated problems facing the Church *qua* Church from those facing the Catholic as an individual. Most "official" (with all the ambiguity of that term!) Catholic organs of opinion were solidly pro-Franco, yet 42 per cent of the Catholics in the sample, a sizeable minority indeed, took an op-

posite position. On this issue at least Catholics showed a much greater tendency toward non-uniformity than did their Protestant brethren. This is only what one should expect, since the tensions of the American Catholic Experience and the askewness we have found characteristic of the relationship between Catholicism and dominant elements in American culture could not fail to expose many Catholics to the cross-pressures of marginality on such an issue. That such would be the case is a quite likely sociological hypothesis. Yet it is the kind of fact that surprises many. So strong in fact is the myth of Catholic homogeneity, itself a residue in non-Catholic thinking of past experiences, even in the minds of otherwise sophisticated observers.



It was communism as the symbol of militant secularism, rather than communism as the symbol of social reform that attracted Catholic aggression. Yet with the success of upward social mobility, the second element also became important. Often enough the very Catholics who enjoyed so much quoting the papal encyclical on *Atheistic Communism* were the ones who played down the papal teachings on social reform and labor or maintained a dignified silence concerning them. As a result of social mobility, in recent years Catholics have tended to abandon their

²⁴*Public Opinion, 1935-1946*. Prepared under the editorial direction of Hadley Cantril by Mildred Strunk. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J., 1951, p. 808.

old allegiance to the Democratic Party in favor of a new suburban Republicanism. However, the association of leftist ideas with the New Deal is also partly responsible, for it caused somewhat of a symbolic reaction toward conservatism. In this situation of real and symbolic conservatism, there appeared the tendency to use the communist charge against reform to assuage Catholic consciences at a time when the Church was stressing papal social teachings.

Continuing alignments

The alignments that began to form in the 1930s continued into the '40s and '50s. The confusion of symbolic and reality responses at the beginning of the last decade was enough to confound even the elect. Some people opposed the Administration for not preventing the Korean War and simultaneously for fighting it when it was not prevented and, at the same time, while opposing the stopping of communism at the 38th parallel, denounced the government as being in the hands of communist dupes or, even worse, agents. Our statesmen were denounced for losing China singlehandedly, while those who raged often showed no interest in stopping communism in the rest of Asia. Especially were communists to be looked for everywhere at home. Moreover, this display of symbolic reactions, carried to the point of mass neurosis which made political life a Donnybrook, gave the descendants of immigrants an additional avenue for expressing a strident identification with America and of showing their brand of Americanism superior

to the questionable loyalties of the corrupt offspring of the older stock. If Al Smith's 1936 "walk" was the symbol of Catholic conservatism derived from social mobility, the figure of Alger Hiss in the 1950s was the symbolic target of the new catharsis. Catholics were not alone in this reaction, since communism had analogous symbolic resonance for non-Catholic conservatives, frustrated by 20 years of reform administrations, for which the word "treason" became such a subjectively satisfying synonym. The hysterical anti-communism of the early 1950s was a national aberration and Catholics were in a minority. Yet there is unhappily a somewhat wry appropriateness in the fact that a Catholic surname, and one with the most honorable Celtic antecedents, became its generally accepted designation.

The trouble with such symbolic reactions, however, is that while they permit a discharge of pent up frustration, their very divergence from reality usually prevents them from altering the situation that makes catharsis necessary. Too often they lead us, pied piper fashion, down the road to the unreal. By alienating those who heed their siren call even farther from reality, they only increase the askewness which rendered one vulnerable to their original appeal. The symbolic aspects of the anti-communist reaction could not fail to increase the askewness between Catholicism and fundamental aspects of American culture. While it made possible some degree of *rapprochement* with secularist forces of a more conservative kind, even there it offered at best only a symbolic, not a real answer to the problems involved. Per-

haps, however, catharsis did dispel enough emotion to produce a degree of psychological calm. At any rate, new developments were at the very time preparing the way for dissipation of extreme behavior.



The residues of unsolved problems remain, and we must expect them to influence Catholic reactions in the future. At the present moment, however, we are in the midst of a great change. The present transformations in our society will affect the heritage of the past in many ways and alter the expression of older attitudes. The competition between the United States and the Soviet Union has changed American attitudes toward revolution in the direction of caution, and has thus brought large sections of opinion closer to traditional Catholic positions. It is in fact the very survival of our values and our way of life, and not the "emancipation" of oppressed mankind from the shackles of tradition in moments of revolutionary ardor and fulfillment, that concerns us at present. As part of this problem, nuclear war presents itself to us as a grim prospect. The result is that foreign policy has become freighted with reality implications of a truly terrifying nature, a future whose outcome we do not see.

When real situations become extremely threatening, two reactions are possible. One is to give up symbolic responses, however satisfying for subjective reasons, and face squarely the problem of survival. The other is to

take refuge from the dangers of reality in a completely symbolic sphere and to confirm the ancient adage that whom the gods destroy they first make mad. Americans in the latter half of the 1950s appear to have chosen the former, aided by the relief and fatigue derived from their symbolic saturnalia of a few years before. We Americans have discovered the inefficaciousness of the Black Mass. This is true for both Catholics and non-Catholics, although it should not be assumed that unreal symbolic reactions are completely a thing of the past. Yet the new sense of reality has brought a new confrontation of responsibility. The relative absence of inappropriate symbolic response in the Catholic reaction to the current opportunity and necessity to negotiate with the Russians, a situation involving serious dangers as well as some promise, is a good example of the new frame of mind.

Secondly, the new situation is characterized by our transformation into an affluent society, dedicated to consumption, affording social mobility in the presiding bureaucratic structures by way of educational attainment. The replacement of capital resources by college training as the chief avenue of social mobility has obvious advantages for the newer groups in the population. Closely related to this is a third dimension, the current breakdown of ethnicity. There is certainly a great deal to be said for the Herberg thesis that ethnic identification is being replaced by membership in the three major religious groupings.²⁸ Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism are, in Herberg's

²⁸Will Herberg, *Protestant-Catholic-Jew*. Doubleday, Garden City, N. Y., 1955.

terms, becoming recognized and accepted as the basic reference groups for membership in American society. They are the "three great religions of democracy." Advancement in a bureaucratic society by educational attainment based upon mass education and the end of ethnic cultural and spiritual ghettos explains largely the present increasing Catholic mobility into the upper-middle class. A new kind of Catholic outlook will necessarily evolve from such a development.

A fourth change, not unrelated to the three above, is the rise in the post-war period of a significant Catholic lay intelligentsia, self-conscious, self-critical and Catholic, a category in which many clerics must also be included. The publication of highly intelligent, quite objective, and acutely critical evaluations of American Catholic life by American Catholics in recent years is one of the most significant cultural developments of the time, a fact recognized by the more shrewd non-Catholic observers. It is a sign of the vitality and fast approaching maturity of an Americanized Catholicism.

The challenge

These developments are part of the new America that is emerging in our day. America has become the inheritor of the older British role of organizing and maintaining a world in which a society such as ours can survive. As such, it is faced with the responsibility of defending the entire Western heritage, a challenge which we struggle, often inadequately, to meet. It is at the same time an America which

has largely solved the problems of production and faces the newer, often obscure, problems of humanizing and ethicizing a consumption society based upon plenty.²⁶ As such, its strategic elite is no longer basically the older entrepreneurial class, but rather one composed of governmental, business, and educational bureaucrats. In such a society, there necessarily develops a large middle and upper-middle class based upon technical know-how and administrative skill. Mass immigration, however, ended a generation ago, and the assimilation cycle has almost run out. The Americanization of groups near to immigration and the bureaucratization of public life coincide to affect social mobility.

What will the America of 30 years hence look like? In what ways will it be continuous and in what ways discontinuous with the America out of which it has emerged? Who indeed can answer these questions? Too few of us really think very much about them. One thing at least is sure. The participation of Catholics in the general life of America will become of greater volume and significance. The new Catholic upper-middle class will make a large difference in terms of Catholic participation in those organizations which influence policy-making. Even in Catholic organizations, we can expect the general tastes, interests, and activities, and even values with respect to a multitude of non-religious matters, to be more like those found in corresponding organizations among non-Catholics.

Moreover, with the present search for

²⁶See David M. Potter, *People Of Plenty*. University of Chicago Press, 1954.

values to render life in the affluent society significant, Catholic values may even gain a new respectability. This has already happened in some circles. Yet here a note of caution is in order. Secularist commitments and, on a larger scale, prejudices among the educated remain strong. That Catholic ideas often run diametrically counter to general positions may be seen in the reception of the statement of the bishops in the United States on birth control and foreign aid issues. How the new problems that life in bureaucratic, affluent, and socially mobile America will raise may or may not polarize Catholic and secularist positions on value problems we cannot say. But Catholicism will remain Catholicism despite important sociological transformations and older conflicts may well assume new and unforeseen forms. Moreover, older residues will find some form of expression in new situations and often render Catholic responses less than adequate. In some cases they may merge with the new conservatism of middle-class Catholics to supply an ideology justifying these groups to themselves. In others, they will give rise to askewness in relation to non-Catholic cultural developments and become the cause of social and personal disarticulation.

One thing, however, is clear. From now on Catholics will play a larger part in the general organizations of American life and will in many important respects be more like their non-Catholic fellow Americans. They will become more important in the dialogue about foreign affairs, and more involved in foreign affairs education.

JUNE, 1960

An International Symposium

Duties to Underdeveloped Countries

The Argument

Leon H. Janssen (*Rotterdam*)

The Fires of Envy

Colin Clark (*Oxford*)

Distribution of Wealth

John M. Paul (*Washington*)

Terms Need Analysis

Thomas H. Mahony (*Boston*)

Problems in International Law

David Johnson (*London*)

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Institute of Social Order

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"Solution of the problem of lay interference severely
of lay counsel and participation in the

Trusteeism and

✱ **ROBERT J. DWYER**

ON JUNE 10, 1785, the New York Legislature, acting under a law passed the previous year, incorporated five Catholic laymen as "The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church in the City of New York." Shortly thereafter a site was procured on Barclay Street and construction was begun on St. Peter's Church. It was an act quite unremarkable in itself, for it followed the usual pattern of Protestant church incorporation at the time and almost indefinitely thereafter, but for the Catholic Church in the United States, then in its merest infancy, it was pregnant with unhappy consequences.

The incident has its bearing on pressing problems confronting us today, a century and three-quarters later, problems concerning the place of the layman in the affairs of the Catholic Church in America, his participation in her public life. For however we may modify or qualify recent allegations of an unnatural dearth of lay leadership and an absence of significant lay participation in that life, there is substantial agreement as to their general

truth. That we are at present acutely conscious of the situation is hardly a credit to our perspicacity; it has been evident for the past half-century at least. But we have the advantage now of a lengthened perspective to study its causes and of a wider experience to evaluate the proposed remedies.

There are many reasons adduced to explain the practical exclusion of the layman from the public life of the Church in America; it is my purpose here to recall and examine only one of them, the experience of Trusteeism. Whether it matches in importance such factors as the overwhelmingly immigrant complexion of the Catholic laity throughout the 19th century, the ghetto mentality of an alien minority championed by a vigorous yet equally alien clergy, or the deliberate suppression of emerging lay leadership by a clergy jealous of its status, would be difficult to determine. It had its bearing on the creation of the problem and it still lingers as an inherited state of mind. Far from being dead in 1960, the fear of Trusteeism is very much alive. The legal battle has long since

limited the opportunities
life of the Church."

After

been won, but the memory of the struggle lingers on.

The birth of the Federal Union and the American Catholic hierarchy dates from 1789. Among the problems which confronted Bishop John Carroll after his return to Maryland from his consecration at Lulworth, England, not the least important was to secure recognition of his episcopal authority from his scattered congregations. There was no threat of heretical inclination among his people or on the part of his priests; it was, moreover, far from his mind to do more than what was strictly necessary to safeguard discipline. Needing priests badly and fully conscious of the fact that he could not exercise effective supervision over the affairs of the more distant congregations, he readily enough settled for a trustee system of parish organization. It was his hope, often enough justified, that tact, wisdom and forbearance on the part of pastors and people would solve most problems of jurisdiction and management.

Nor had he and his clergy any other experience to guide them. The Church

in England and Ireland still labored under penal disabilities, while the Church in France, on the eve of the Revolution, had worked out over the centuries a modified form of trustee administration with which the hierarchy was generally satisfied. So it was that, as in the case of St. Peter's in New York, Bishop Carroll was content to sanction the system. Indeed, in view of the contemporary prejudice against any hierarchical order, principally directed against the Episcopal Church, widely suspected of pushing to effect its national establishment in the new Republic, it is extremely doubtful if he could have obtained legal authority for any other form of incorporation.

It may be added that Bishop Carroll's attitude toward the problem, certainly at the outset of his episcopate, contained the promise of vital lay participation in the life of the Church, simply because it was based upon a cordial spirit of respect between clergy and laity. It is tempting, if fruitless, to speculate upon what might have been the results of this cooperation had not trusteeism been turned upon him and his successors as a scourge rather than a blessing.

This unfortunate development, however, was prompt to appear. Here again it is difficult if not impossible to assess the primary responsibility. Carroll, like

Bishop Dwyer's Doctorate is in History. Author of The Gentile Comes To Utah (Catholic University Press, 1941), he is Bishop of Reno, Nev. This article, prepared for the Foreign Policy Association colloquium, suggests an historical influence explaining the relative unconcern of the American Catholic laity for international affairs and, indeed, for the public life of the Church.

many another missionary bishop before and after him, was forced by sheer necessity to deal with a great many cantankerous priests, misfits in their own dioceses of origin or in their religious communities, seeking in the New World greener pastures for their ecclesiastical browsing. Hardly had Carroll settled into the administration of his unwieldy diocese than he was forced to deal with an endless series of cases involving priests who were either unworthy or simply unstable and disobedient. New York itself had been the scene of such an unpleasantness in the very year of the incorporation of the Church when Carroll was still only Prefect Apostolic; in the strife between the factions supporting the two contenders to the pastorate of St. Peter's, Father Charles Whelan and Father Andrew Nugent. The trustees took sides with the latter, who apparently enjoyed a becoming gift of oratory. They asserted their right to appoint and depose their pastor, denying outright the competence of any ecclesiastical superior to determine otherwise. Wrote Carroll:

If ever the principles then laid down should become predominant, the unity and Catholicity of our Church would be at an end; and it would be formed into independent and distinct societies, nearly in the same manner as the congregational Presbyterians of our neighboring New England States.

Were turbulent and ambitious priests chiefly to blame in stirring up the trustees to defiance of episcopal authority or were the trustees, inoculated with the spirit of the times, themselves the fomenters of the disorders? Undoubtedly, the responsibility was divided. Among the early Irish immi-

grants particularly there was noted a scarcely restrained enthusiasm for the American experiment in democratic republicanism; they hardly hesitated to embrace ecclesiastical polity in the fervor for liberty, equality and fraternity. During the decade of the 1790s the euphoria of the French Revolution spread over the land and, though one Irishman, Burke, was to stand forth as its most discerning critic, others of his race, at home and in America, were willing to blink at its attack on religion and to concentrate attention upon its vindication of the rights of man.

No permanent disunity

This was America, land of the free. Since all things were new in this land of opportunity, would it not be possible to clothe the Church herself in a Grecian robe with a Phrygian cap to crown her? It is interesting, in retrospect, to ponder the fact that however close many of the promoters of trusteeism came to open and avowed schism, however grievously they were tempted to break with the Church, there were, in the upshot, exceedingly few instances where the quarrel came to such an irreparable conclusion. There was bitterness, there was defiance, but there was nothing in the way of a permanent disruption of the unity of the Church in America.

New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Charleston, in one center after another trusteeism arose to plague Carroll's administration. Nor were the Irish by any means the sole offenders. In Pennsylvania the German congregations insisted on having their own way with pastors of their own choice; in Norfolk and

Charleston the trouble was abetted by French and Spanish trustees. It has been remarked as strange that when Carroll summoned his first synod, on November 7, 1791, he failed to enact legislation dealing with a problem already serious. It may be that he hoped that it was only a passing phase, that sound judgment and a hoped-for supply of zealous and reliable pastors might solve it without the necessity of canonical action. If so, he was mistaken. It is worth noting, however, that in the area around Baltimore, where his personal influence was most readily felt, there was relatively little trouble either during his lifetime or after it. But as distance weakened his personal supervision the problem steadily worsened. With the erection of the province of Baltimore in 1808, with New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and Bardstown as suffragans, his new brethren of the American hierarchy were to experience the challenge in more aggravated form.

And as though to signalize the national scope of the problem, the acquisition of Louisiana focussed Catholic attention on the existence of trusteeism in New Orleans in one of its most extreme manifestations. There the machinations of an intruding priest, Antonio de Sedilla, hand-in-glove with a trustee corporation in absolute control of the Cathedral, presented a particularly baffling situation, causing Carroll the gravest anxiety in his role as Apostolic Administrator. The closing years of his episcopate were undoubtedly shadowed by the growing threat of lay interference with the essential jurisdiction of the Catholic hierarchy and troubled by the cognate anxiety of securing the goods of the Church from the temporal administration of men who

were in actual opposition to the policies of their ecclesiastical leaders. There was emerging a spirit of mutual distrust between the clergy loyal and devoted to their bishops and those lay leaders who aspired to control her temporalities and to dictate her administration.



The period between the death of Archbishop Carroll in 1815 and the convening of the First Provincial Council of Baltimore in 1829 has been called the critical period of our American Church history. It was during these years that the contest over trusteeism was most widespread and acute, when the antagonisms and antipathies which it produced settled into firm policies and habits of thought. Trusteeism was emphatically one of the gravest problems to confront the Church in her formative years in this country; there is, however, no reason to exaggerate its importance out of due proportion. It troubled the internal peace of the Church and made public demonstration of certain of her weaknesses; it must be remembered, nevertheless, that it actually worked far more often than it floundered. It was typical of trusteeism that it became a problem demanding attention in some of the more conspicuous Catholic centers; yet in hundreds of towns and villages over the land, and in several broad areas, it worked reasonably well.

As might be expected, trusteeism during this critical period flourished chiefly in those areas of the American Church where the episcopal administration, for whatever reason, was weak and ineffectual; it tended to reasonable conformity where the administration was firm and strong. Thus, the infamous Hogan Schism of Philadelphia, which split and sundered the Church in that city and diocese for over a decade, was unquestionably a reflection of the timid and tentative approach of Bishop Conwell to the responsibilities of his office. In New York the indifferent health and advanced age of Bishop Connolly allowed the situation to get out of hand for a period. In Louisiana the erratic administration of Bishop Dubourg failed miserably and almost disastrously to quell the disturbances of the malcontents. Nor can it be said that the immediate successors of Archbishop Carroll at Baltimore, Neale and Marechal, lent vigor to the opposition. In contrast, New England under the gentle but steady influence of Bishop Cheverus experienced surprisingly little of the malady, Bruté and Rosati in the West were untroubled by it to any marked degree, and Bishop England of Charleston, encountering it at the outset of his administration in one of its most virulent forms, was able in the long run to turn it to his own advantage.

The effects

But our present interest in this unhappy far-off thing is not the details of its history but the effect it had upon the mind of Catholic America. The generations of priests and laity who lived through the struggle, who heard

the invective of bitterness, who pondered the problem of authority, who saw unworthy priests supported by factious trustee corporations, who witnessed the humiliation of bishops, drew their conclusions and lived to apply them. Inevitably, under the circumstances, it was the viewpoint of the clergy which prevailed. Not only must trusteeism be tamed and muzzled, or altogether liquidated, but the laity itself must be taught the stern lesson of submission. The manly aspiration of the Founder of the American hierarchy for a generous spirit of cooperation between clergy and laity tended to be replaced by a clericalism which was consciously or unconsciously reactionary.

The First Provincial Council of Baltimore in 1829 marked the turning of the tide. The Fathers, under the presidency of Archbishop Whitfield but largely inspired and invigorated by the personality of Bishop England, enacted legislation which forced the submission of trustee bodies to the will of the ordinary. Church property thereafter must be vested in the bishop, either personally or as the acknowledged presiding officer of the trustee corporation. To safeguard the legal aspects of the question Chief Justice Roger B. Taney and two Associate Justices of the Supreme Court were invited to attend the session devoted to the discussion of the decrees on trusteeism. This may be taken as indicative of a shift in the general attitude of the American courts, which were beginning to recognize the problem in its relation to the ownership of church property and to settle for the ordinaries as the permanent trustees.

In the 30 years between the Baltimore Council and the outbreak of the Civil War trusteeism continued to disturb the peace of the Church, Bishop Timon of Buffalo being one of the prelates who found his administration hampered by the rank insubordination of contentious parish corporations. The problem was compounded during this era by the efforts of the Know-Nothings, or Native Americans, to capitalize upon public dissension within the Catholic body and to exacerbate differences between the clergy and laity. In some isolated instances this objective of driving a wedge between the hierarchy and the people met with temporary success; on the whole, however, Nativism did more than any other factor to weld the Catholic body together and to end the quarrel over trusteeism. In the face of an avowed common enemy, clergy and laity tended to close ranks very rapidly, to compose their differences, and to agree that the bishops of necessity must be upheld in matters of internal discipline and the stewardship of temporalities.



It would be tedious to review the slow stages by which the American hierarchy, during the course of the second half of the century, succeeded in containing trusteeism. The decrees of the subsequent Provincial Councils of Baltimore and of the Plenary Councils which began in 1852 steadily reiter-

ated the evils of independent lay trusteeism and the urgency of full conformity with the discipline of the Church. Legislation which had upheld the rights of lay trustees as against the authority of the ordinaries was gradually repealed, often in favor of the bishop as a "corporation sole," with full power to act in complete independence of lay interference, a concept which has gradually won widest acceptance in American courts. By 1884, the year of the third Plenary Council, the problem was no longer of primary importance for the Fathers, though still of sufficient weight to call for extensive treatment and a strong protest against the remaining legal disabilities.

Dead as national issue

It may be said, in summary, that trusteeism vexed the Church in America and to a degree hampered her progress during the period extending, roughly, from 1790 to the Civil War. Thereafter it was a declining force, occasionally invoked by dissident parish corporations, chiefly of foreign complexion, who found themselves at odds with the local bishops on issues largely racial or national. It gradually ceased to have any national significance or to pose any general threat of disobedience or non-conformity. Indeed, as has already been suggested, it is doubtful if it did this even during the period of its greatest strength.

But it did something to the Church or, shall we say, to the American Catholic mind; its effect remains a living force today, long after the echoes of the contest have died away. Trusteeism, as it developed and as it manifested itself as a real or potential threat

to ecclesiastical discipline, had to go. As a limitation upon the ordinaries in the conduct of ecclesiastical affairs, the ownership and management of church property, the appointment or dismissal of pastors, it could not be tolerated. As a source of contention between clergy and laity it was unhealthy and dangerous. Nevertheless, by inevitable reaction, the elimination or neutralizing of trusteeism tended, so to speak, to polarize the Church. It placed the hierarchy and clergy firmly on one side of the line, the laity on the other. Solution of the problem of lay interference, severely limited the opportunities of lay counsel and participation in the public life of the Church. It created a clerical frame of mind by which the laity was regarded as having a minimal share in that public life and a lay frame of mind which was content to settle on that basis.

Quite obviously it is difficult if not actually impossible to document these statements, especially in view of the fact that many other elements entered into the picture, notably the enormous immigrant tide which overwhelmed the Church in America during the second half of the 19th century and whose effect was to coincide with clerical leadership as against lay passivity. There are hints of it, certainly, in the division of the hierarchy toward the end of the century, where the fears voiced by the conservative bishops in such matters as lay organizations and school administration may be traced to their vivid recollection of trusteeism and their determination that nothing like it should ever again be permitted to unsettle the Church. It is even noteworthy that there was a certain cor-

respondence of background experience and of attitude on the part of the prelates involved, for those whose dioceses still bore the scars of trusteeism, such as Bishop McQuaid of Rochester, were readily lined up against those, such as Archbishop Ireland of St. Paul, who had had little occasion to study its effects. It would be a matter of great interest, were the sources available, to study the content and the effect of seminary training, especially in fields of ecclesiastical history and pastoral counseling in order to discover the attitudes transmitted on the question of trusteeism itself and on the larger question of lay participation in the public life of the Church.

Bury the corpse!

The clerical mind, characteristically, is endowed with a long memory. It may well be that trusteeism as such has faded out of sight as a conscious recollection, yet the anxieties occasioned by it still lend substance to clerical distrust of lay leadership. It is happily true to say that in our generation this is a vanishing prejudice; it fulfills the old saw, however, by dying hard. It still has enough vitality to offer resistance, sporadic and local it is true, but nevertheless observable and measurable, to movements like the liturgical revival and Catholic participation in social reconstruction.

The history of trusteeism may account for the origin and survival of tensions and misunderstandings in the American Catholic body; it does not justify their canonization as fixtures of our thought and action. It might be considered that a century is enough time to bury a corpse.

DIPLOMACY TODAY

KURT VON SCHUSCHNIGG

DIPLOMACY is defined as the art of negotiation. Yet it is precisely here that contemporary diplomacy is burdened with difficulties unknown, at least on the present scale, in the 19th century. In theory, of course, there are no unnegotiable nor unjusticable problems; in reality, however, unnegotiable questions—the real crux of the present stalemate giving rise to the cold war—are blocking effective diplomatic action. These unnegotiable questions are not the result, at least primarily, of the conflict of ideologies. Such basic antagonism has occurred before in history; it has posed difficult, though not insurmountable, barriers to the peaceful conduct of foreign relations. The unhappy fact is that our contemporary political world lacks the essential of successful traditional diplomatic action: the existence of an accepted status quo. Such a status quo was based on definitely drawn, “historic” national frontiers. Whenever these national borders were seriously disputed, military planners took over from the diplomats, for border questions, except for those involving minor rectifications, are not negotiable. We are heirs today of

an imposed and precarious peace, one perpetually threatened by unaccepted, geographical changes dictated against the will of the inhabitants. Inevitably, as long as the neuralgic questions identified with important disputed national frontiers remain unsettled, our political world can at best be deemed to be only in a state of transition.

Unlike previous peace settlements, the treaties following both World Wars failed to re-establish historic national borders in East-Central Europe. Some of the dictated frontiers had from the outset small chance of permanent acceptance. Hugo Grotius was far ahead of his time in teaching that no territory should change hands without a plebiscite being held. So, too, was Woodrow Wilson with his restatement of the right of self-determination. The

Professor von Schuschnigg, Professor at Saint Louis University, is the author of the recent International Law, An Introduction to the Law of Peace (Bruce, Milwaukee). His most famous (and most painful) experience in diplomacy was when, as Chancellor of the Austrian Republic, he was summoned to Berchtesgaden by Hitler.

gap between the declaration of principles of International Law and concrete political decisions cannot be bridged by traditional diplomacy when basic rights of men and of nations are at stake. You cannot have the cake and eat it; you cannot trade and negotiate what you profess to be un-negotiable.

Unbalanced situation

The bitter struggle to exhaustion in both World Wars was a major blunder. The most "Pyrrhic victory in history" left a situation "more unbalanced and dangerous than any known to Europe since the dark ages." The quotation is taken from a broad and stimulating symposium, published in the International Studies Series of Notre Dame University, where 20 distinguished contributors provide varied but extremely useful fare for serious students of International Relations.¹

The first eight chapters deal with "general issues." Hans J. Morgenthau reviews the "Permanent Values in the Old Diplomacy," Quincy Wright discusses "the Role of International Law in Contemporary Diplomacy," Jacques de Bourbon-Busset, a former assistant director in the cabinet of Robert Schuman displays a typical French brilliance of style and lucidity of thought in outlining "Decision-Making in Foreign Policy."

In the second section the objectives, the operations, the organization and the particular characteristics of the

foreign service of the major powers involved in World War II are described. The essay of the late Sir David Kelley on British diplomacy is the most conclusive presentation this writer has ever encountered. Stephen D. Kertesz' comparative analysis of "American and Soviet Negotiating Behaviour" is outstanding.

The third section of the book "New Actors and Changing Roles" is a warning against restricting any considerations of modern diplomacy to an examination of the practices of the Great Powers. Forming a bloc of impressive territorial size, population and future economic potential, the uncommitted nations represent a factor whose proportions can no longer be contemned as at the Midsummer Night's Dream of San Francisco in 1945. One of the contributors to this symposium announces that Europe is "on the point of becoming merely peripheral," a judgment that can only be verified after settlement of the German question whose solution, in turn, supposes a German peace treaty and German reunification.



The fact is that the number of sovereign nations has substantially increased and is scheduled to continue increasing. At present the flags of 82 countries fly at the headquarters of the UN, each representing a nation of equal legal status with a vote of equal weight. With the Security Council for

¹ DIPLOMACY IN A CHANGING WORLD. Edited by Stephen D. Kertesz and M. A. Fitzsimons, C.S.C. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame Ind. 407 pp. \$7.50.

all practical purposes deadlocked, the consequences for this developing phenomenon are immense. It seems hardly credible today (though there is a certain irony in the remembrance) that there once was a vogue for an American-Soviet joint police monopoly to constitute the core of the International Organization. In the General Assembly the Arab States alone can out-vote the U.S. and the members of the British Commonwealth or the USSR and their European satellites. With their 17 votes the free countries of Europe are vastly outnumbered by the 30 votes of the Afro-Asian bloc.

Role of diplomat

As a result, there are more diplomats at work in our present world; the scope of their activities has been widened and their personal qualifications are of more moment than ever before. Paradoxical as it may seem, despite the standardizing trends of our changing world, despite the rapid means of communication to distant capitals (a fact calculated to degrade the diplomat to a mere messenger), individual personalities seem to be of a greater importance than in the period of classical diplomacy. There have been conspicuous contributions, for example, of the representatives of small nations at the headquarters of international organizations.

It is certainly abnormal that the single, strongest element of free Europe still is not represented at the United Nations. The fact is inevitable as long as the present division of Germany lasts. The German problem, to be sure, confronts diplomacy with an extremely difficult psychological issue: a threat

of the past needs to be reconciled with the needs of the future and, because of the exigencies of the present, this reconciliation does not permit of indefinite delay.

A lucid presentation of contemporary German foreign policies is offered by the University of Hamburg's Professor Krueger in an essay that matches in its sound reappraisal of *Realpolitik* that of his British counterpart. *Idealpolitik* might be termed the characteristic of Mr. A. Appadorai's chapter on "Indian Diplomacy," a position in marked contrast to the German and British views. Thus Mr. V. K. Krishna Menon, addressing the General Assembly, is invoked to express this position:

We have found that the promotion of neighbourliness, agreements on non-aggression and mutual respect are ways of promoting cooperation. It may be asked: is your system likely to succeed? . . . Have the other systems succeeded? Can anybody turn 'round to us and say that the doctrine of the balance of power is more likely to help us, or to succeed—that doctrine which is the legacy of Metternich, of Castlereagh and of Talleyrand, which wrecked the principle of universalism and culminated in the war of 1914, and which to this day is making incursions into international affairs? I am reminded of the statement of a great Frenchman, Rousseau, who said that the strongest is never strong enough to be always master unless he transfers strength into right and obedience into duty.

This sounds very optimistic indeed; one can only fervently hope—despite Mr. Krishna Menon's public failure in his recent conversations with Chou En-Lai over the issue of 51,000 square miles of frontier area—that India will fare better with her alliance on agreements of non-aggression and mutual respect than did her Western friends in the past. It must also be recorded, however, that

Metternich and Castlereagh had to face not a Rousseauian world but the wreckage of the Napoleonic Era; it might be conceded that they did, after all, quite well in checking for at least a century this kind of universalism which emerged anew in its monstrous neo-German version.

Perspective changes issues

The juxtaposition of competently presented Indian and German views on diplomatic methods emphasizes how basically identical issues are conceived in different national perspectives. In the view of Professor Krueger *Realpolitik* has nothing in common with cynicism and power politics. It is, rather, the policy of honest traders who realize that in the long run a breach of contract or the use of pressure do not pay. The German jurist, however, only conditionally believes in the rule of law in international relations:

Law as a genuine argument remains especially discredited as long as the point of view is maintained that even under threat or compulsion ratified international agreements can make a claim to inviolability.

Such a belief contradicts the established doctrine that an international treaty, contrary to national contract law, is not invalidated because it was concluded under duress. In the opinion of this reviewer such a pragmatic approach has small chance of being generally accepted; nor would such acceptance be particularly fruitful, since it would add a further element of uncertainty in international relations and would invite unjusticiable disputes. It is certainly true, however, that every international treaty should provide effective machinery for its amendment.

Despite the ritual bow toward the great concept of international collaboration, the differing national interests, expounded in the several essays of this book, explain the tongue-in-cheek attitude of the authors toward the UN and in particular toward common UN action. The Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld is foremost among the authors contributing concluding chapters evaluating the UN and its importance for international diplomacy. Sir Pierson Dixon, the permanent representative of the United Kingdom at the UN, describes the functions of diplomacy, emphasizing particularly such timely topics as open debate and private negotiations and private discussions, conciliation procedures, means to make the UN more effective in the absence of formal Charter amendment and, finally, colonialism. On this last point Sir Pierson observed:

Soviet propaganda seeks to represent Great Britain as a would-be colonizing power and the U.S. as the imperialists of to-day. The fact is that the U.S. is contributing to the progress of undeveloped countries in a significant and disinterested way, and Britain for the past century and more has been leading the dependent parts of her empire to independence. The Soviet Union on the other hand has acquired and consolidated an imperial hold over people of non-Russian race, both in Central-Asia and in Eastern-Europe.

A final chapter by Walter H. Laves describes UNESCO as a potential center of cultural diplomacy. It might be noted that events up to 1957 primarily are covered in the book. This is especially true for France, although Professor J. B. Duroselle has supplied a brief postscript to bring the account of French diplomacy up-to-date.

Listening to the delightfully varied accents found in this symposium,

one learns that the world has not really changed. International studies still start from "what is" and, proceeding to "what ought to be," continue to concern themselves with the answer to "what to do?" When one compares the first 12 chapters in this book with the other sections, especially the chapters discussing the UN, the basic counterpoint of the theme becomes quite apparent. In the Introduction our present world is described as a community *manqué*, *manqué* because, in the absence of any consensus, it has failed to achieve its ideal objective. The symposium concludes with an appraisal of the potentialities for an international society. Arguing that the primary value of the UN is as an instrument for negotiation and as the best available clearinghouse for competing ideas, the book concedes that its original ambitious aim has not been attained and that, things being as they are, has no chance of being attained in the foreseeable future. The old order is here irretrievably destroyed: that seems to be the total meaning of the "changing world." The change did not produce an utopian international society vested with the clear authority of arbitrating and passing judgment or, in other words, of enforcing law in the interest of an institutionalized international peace. And yet, here is precisely where new avenues open up to the practice of political arts in their noblest meaning: the scope of traditionally national diplomacy is widened and organized international conciliation, outweighing in practical importance international adjudication, emphasizes the multilateral factors and facets of the once predominantly bilateral business of national diplomacy.

Much has been written about the reactionary men and methods of the Council of Vienna. Theirs was the mistake to play the diplomatic game with pawns of national interest on the political chessboard in, as they believed, rational fashion. What we have experienced in our time looks very much like a repeat performance on a worldwide scale. That we have not learned from their failure and that of the men of Versailles need not make us pessimistic; that the improvement in our present situation is due rather to the progress of technology than to the advance of the legal science, does not matter. The world now knows that war is no longer an alternative to diplomacy. War inevitably makes things worse than before by sowing seeds of new strife. International diplomacy in the widest sense of the term, by availing itself of the machinery of international organization, offers the greatest hope for the future. This hope will be achieved not so much through negotiation (there are, as we have seen, unnegotiable questions) as through education and by an instinctive competition for support from international public opinion.

There is certainly no reason for over-optimism. Today's atmosphere is laden with dangerous tensions hardly less ominous than in the 1920s. And yet there is a chance to make this seemingly unstable world a safer place. It is, as one of the authors of this symposium declares, through "Diplomacy by patience and planning . . . and not by slogan . . . based on a genuine regard for the Charter as a whole and not diplomacy that picks and chooses according to the tactical advantages of the moment."

ARMS AND LATIN AMERICA

Kevin Corrigan

Mr. Corrigan is a journalist who has concentrated his attention on Latin America.

UNQUESTIONABLY, one of the main factors in assessing a book must be its "readability." One certainly need not agree with Gibbons' tendentious thesis to enjoy his *Decline and Fall* and, whether one is a Catholic or not, the remarkable descriptions of Roman life and worship in *The City of God* are fascinating. On this score, Professor Lieuwen's book¹ should get high marks. Moreover, his subject—militarism in Latin America—is of central importance in any approach to the problems of social order in Latin America.

It is certainly a book worthy of taking its place beside some of the earlier Council on Foreign Relations studies, books such as those of Langer and Gleason on the prelude to World War II and Kissinger's important volume, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*. In a way it is related to Kissinger's book, since it ends by posing serious problems involved in our over-all politico-military posture.

The question which Professor Lieuwen poses is this: whether, because of alleged world-wide strategic necessities, the U. S. should continue military assistance programs in Latin America; these, he suggests, tend to strengthen

indigenous armed forces to the detriment of social progress. Thus stated, a negative reply is, of course, expected. Professor Lieuwen gives such a reply in these words:

... because of the pressing Latin American social problem ... United States anti-communist military programs may be playing directly into the hands of the enemy against whom they are directed.

Aside from posing and suggesting an answer to this important and too often ignored question, Professor Lieuwen has also performed the invaluable service of outlining the role of military leaders and armed forces in Latin American history.

He points to two major periods: the era of disorder followed by the emergence of military dictatorships from the time of independence from Spain until, roughly, the first World War; and, since then, what he calls a "crumbling of the old order." This latter epoch has been accompanied for the most part by the emergence of stronger middle classes and the growth of urban life.

In all these developments the armed forces have played a prominent and often decisive role.

The author concludes his historical analysis, occupying the first two-thirds of the book, by dividing present day Latin American countries into three groups: a first group where the military still dominates the political scene; a

¹ ARMS AND POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA. By Edwin Lieuwen. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Praeger, New York. xiii, 296pp. Bibliography, index. \$4.75.

second where the armed forces are in a state of transition toward a strictly professional and non-political status; and a final group of nations where the armed forces are already "professional" and non-political. This historical section, complete to the beginning of 1959, is fascinating and instructive. Especially interesting is the long chapter, "Curbing Militarism in Mexico: A Case Study."

Unfortunately, however, Professor Lieuwen's presentation suffers at times from "bookishness," a tendency to rely too fully on written sources. For example, the sections dealing with Colombia, ascribed to Vernon Lee Fluharty's *Dance of the Millions*, show real insight. On the other hand, the portions dealing with Venezuela and based on Romulo Betancourt's *Venezuela*, published in Mexico during his exile, read more like a partisan brief than a detached historical analysis.

Nevertheless, *Arms and Politics in Latin America* must be recommended to anyone searching for a better grasp of what's happening in Latin America, and why. It must be recognized at the same time that the author's point of view is almost totally "secularistic." Thus, while examples of Latin American political and social changes are reported in an interesting and instructive manner, all the talk of "social revolution" is cast in humanist terms.

The unstated premise in the discussions of Latin America's place in the world-wide drama posed by the Soviet drive to subdue the globe to its sway is that materialistic factors are *the* single, decisive element. Thus, according to this analysis, the "crucial question" facing the U. S. in this area of the world is this:

Is the United States, in pursuing its supposed hemisphere security goals, interfering with the normal social evolution of the Latin American peoples and, if so, how long can it continue to do so?

Accompanying this query is the implication that *unless* material conditions (alone) improve notably, the people of Latin America will not have the capacity to resist the spread of Sovietism.

This is, of course, a variant on the theme that poverty by itself "breeds" communism and that high living standards perforce discourage it. Would that communism were such a simple threat! But such an analysis fails under pragmatic testing, as was shown in the Korean prisoner-of-war camps where the high-living-standard Americans, especially the 18-year-olds, were easy prey for communist propaganda, while the low-living-standard Turks, and *Colombians*, resisted to a man.

On the other hand, the agonizing problem of institutionalized poverty, which is recognized by many such materialistic analyses, should be a challenge to American Catholics. If ever there was a time demanding a fraternal and creative response to a serious problem, this is it. And we are especially required to answer such a call: the very "materialism," for which some of our hyper-intellectual European fellow-Catholics belabor us, supplies an effective hope of success. For the prosperity which we share with our fellow-Americans makes possible the creation of economic mechanisms capable of destroying the vicious circle of poverty created by under-capitalization, under-protection, under-distribution and under-consumption.

At the same time, as members of Christ's Mystical Body, we can lend our

support to such activities in a way which recognizes the essential spiritual imperative which governs all true progress. Again, Catholic Americans stand at a providential crossroads. Unconsciously, we breathe an atmosphere of juridical stability which makes social justice a practical goal which can be striven for by means of normal social and political action. (Contrast this with the fate of our coreligionists in, say, Poland, Hungary or China!)

The tradition of the Rule of Law

could be propagated in Latin America with revolutionary effect. However, such an effort requires both dedication to a high spiritual ideal plus a hard-headed realization that we face in Latin America (as indeed, everywhere in the world) a firmly-established and dynamic force which is, in its heart of hearts, a radical denial of the spiritual, juridical and practical ideals for which we stand and not a peacefully competitive system of social reform.

Books



LABOR IN A FREE SOCIETY. Edited by Michael Harrington and Paul Jacobs. University of California Press, Berkeley. xi, 186 pp. \$3

This is another volume resulting from a conference sponsored by the Fund for the Republic to inquire into the extent of freedom in our society. Since trade unions represent an important democratic institution, the authors of the various papers presented attempt to analyze the contribution that labor can make in promoting democracy by reforming its internal practices vis-a-vis its own members. While the collective bargaining function is not ignored, it is considered merely as part of the environment influencing a particular type of union organization.

This discussion antedated the passage of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959; many of its pros and cons in the area of legislation regulating union affairs are, therefore, dated. However, it is interesting to note that the philosophical nature of several of the

articles (notably those of Archibald Cox and David Cole) make them just as effective in judging the law as an accepted fact as they were in testing legislation which was pending in May 1958 when the conference was held.

The general consensus (if there can be such, considering the divergent opinions among qualified minds) is that absence of formal democratic procedures does not necessarily mean that a union is undemocratic; conversely, presence of formal democratic procedures does not necessarily mean that a union is democratic. However, apart from formalities, the exercise of certain basic freedoms by union members—such as freedom of speech (including criticism) and freedom of assembly (including organization for the purpose of replacing undesirable leadership)—should be guaranteed without fear of reprisal and without impairing the union's functioning as an organization. It will be interesting to see what the new law will do towards accomplishing this dual objective.

As Arthur Goldberg points out, we cannot hope to blot out all injustice in a realistic society; we can only set the "maximum limit of injustice which the free society will tolerate." Failure to apply this reasonable standard to unions, according to Cole, imposes "the impossible dichotomy"—expecting a union to do an effective job "in promoting the economic interests of the workers" and at the same time expecting it to be so sensitive to individual rights as to "operate as though it were an anarchy within itself."

A summary of the British and Australian experience in this connection makes it quite clear that there are many legal and extra-legal means which can be used to accomplish the "freedom" objective and that the most effective are those which fit the traditions of the particular country and labor movement involved.

This volume is a thought-provoking collection; it does not, however, pretend to answer most of the problems which it raises.

GLADYS W. GRUENBERG
Washington University
Saint Louis, Mo.

LENIN AND WORLD REVOLUTION. By Stanley W. Page. New York University Press. 252 pp. \$5

Dr. Page, who is an associate professor of history at the City College of New York and the author also of *The Formation of the Baltic States*, wrote this brief book to explain his thesis that Lenin's theories were all "rationalizations designed to mask his personal strivings." In other words, Dr. Page has sought to explain Lenin's ideas and actions as masks for a drive for personal power, power this time on a world scale. This is not a new theory—indeed some of Lenin's opponents, and even some of his colleagues, considered the entire Bolshevik movement the effort of a small group of the intelligentsia to seize power behind a socialist facade.

Professor Page ignores this social or sociological interpretation to concentrate entirely upon Lenin as an individual; the motivations of his colleagues are not examined, and Page apparently was not aware of the interpretations of Lenin which would

have supported his thesis. Moreover, perhaps because his interest does not reflect his main research concerns, he fails to provide a solid foundation for the reader in the Marxist thought which was the base from which the Bolsheviks all operated. Thus, Marx is ignored and even Lenin's early writings and activities are given scant attention in Page's concentration on Lenin's drive to power and his brief period of rule. Less than 20 per cent of the book is devoted to the first 44 years of Lenin's life; the reader is plunged into the First World War early in the second chapter.

It is also surprising that a book devoted to proving Lenin's "compulsive will to dominate" reflects no knowledge of or reference to the vast literature on this subject which specialists in several fields of the social sciences have contributed, particularly in the last three decades. Finally, the volume is based almost entirely on Lenin's own publications, which surely must be the main source but which should have been buttressed by reference to the vast flood of information available on this subject in other primary materials, including the memoirs of some of Lenin's colleagues.

However, Page does have an interesting and perhaps even a valid thesis. Certainly it is a corrective for those who see history unfolding according to a vast cosmic plan or who see Soviet leaders always acting selflessly for the good of the Party and the Cause.

ROBERT F. BYRNES
Indiana University
Bloomington, Ind.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH. By Harry G. Johnson. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 204 pp. \$4

This collection of essays, which previously appeared in a number of journals, is recommended for specialists in international trade. While the essays do not pretend to offer an integrated theory of trade, they do constitute important studies in the field. Professor Johnson of the University of Chicago seeks to do two things: 1. "to push the application of known and tested techniques into new areas;" 2. "to review the

existing body of literature with the double object of verifying the accuracy of accepted conclusions and synthesizing the methods and results of previous writers into a simpler analysis."

Professor Johnson writes lucidly and in only one essay demands that the reader be able to follow the argument through mathematical formula. Chapter 2, "Optimum Tariff and Retaliation," brilliantly illustrates the author's capacity to push forward application of techniques. Chapter 3, "Economic Expansion and International Trade," demonstrates equally well his ability to verify accepted conclusions and to synthesize into simpler analysis.

PHILIP LAND, S.J.
Gregorian University,
Rome

THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY. By
F. A. Hayek. University of Chicago
Press, 570 pp., \$7.50

A reader familiar with the general thought of Professor Hayek may well approach his latest book with the feeling that it will offer little that is new. In this he will be mistaken. While Hayek espouses the broad outlines of classical continental liberalism, his treatment in detail is both different and rewarding.

In general, his is a plea for liberty under law. Law is presented in the best medieval tradition as a rule of reason representing the broad consensus of the community. It consists of enactments that aim to promote the common good, not the private interests of anyone, including the law-maker. Regulations that seek to promote special interests, whether of individuals or groups, whether of minorities or even of the majority, are coercive and contrary to true liberty.

Under the category of coercion are most of the measures undertaken by the modern state to promote social welfare. Likewise, much of the functioning of present day unionism is considered coercive. Central economic planning is unwise and wasteful. Property and the wealthy class should be freed of most social controls imposed during the 19th and 20th centuries. We would

then have an optimum organization of society, both politically and economically.

This philosophy of liberty should be carefully distinguished from the conservatism prevalent in the United States. Many American conservatives are obscurantist and nationalist. They oppose change as such and reject facts that conflict with their prejudices. Since the terms liberalism and conservatism have been so misused, the author prefers to describe himself as an Old Whig.

Surprisingly, in such an erudite study (there are over 100 pages of notes, with liberal quotations in Latin, French, German, and Italian, etc.), the reviewer was unable to find any reference to papal teaching on liberal individualism. Certainly the major social encyclicals are pertinent to the general theme of this book.

It would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to reconcile the philosophy of the present book with that of *Quadragesimo Anno*. Nonetheless, Catholic social philosophers will find this a treatment deserving of the most careful study. Rejection of *laissez-faire* should not mean automatic espousal of the welfare state. Those who consider a social market economy ideal may find that they have more in common with Hayek than with Beveridge. At any rate, they will note, whatever their objections in detail, that this book represents real thinking and in turn forces its readers to think. This is no small tribute to the author.

JOHN F. CRONIN, S.S.
N.C.W.C.
Washington, D. C.

FAMILY WORLDS, A Psychosocial Approach to Family Life. By Robert D. Hess and Gerald Handel. University of Chicago Press. xiii, 306 pp. \$3

The continued search for new approaches in studying family life reflects considerable dissatisfaction with current methods. The authors of this interesting study proceed on the assumption that a family is something more than a group of interacting personalities. Within the family circle, individual images and responses are interrelated in terms of a particular content

that may be termed a "family theme," that is, some fundamental view of reality and some way or ways for dealing with it. The theme reveals the family's implicit direction, its notion of "who we are" and "what we do about it."

Five case studies are presented to illustrate the usefulness of the concept of theme. Although one may question whether all families develop themes or whether the concept itself is sufficiently specific, the case studies reveal that the authors have penetrated the inner world of family life and aptly described the complexities of motives and interaction among family members. Their approach merits serious consideration.

JOHN L. THOMAS, S.J.

CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN THOUGHT AND CHRISTIAN FAITH.

By Albert Dondeyne, translated by Ernan McMullin and John Burnheim. Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh. xi, 211 pp. \$4.75

This book is a significant confrontation of contemporary European thought and Christian faith. The author's thesis is that existential phenomenology has not only many problems that demand solutions but has much to contribute to *philosophia perennis*.

The author locates existential phenomenology as a bridge between naturalism and intellectualism; since this philosophy is concerned with human existence in-the-world, historicity and the irrational are found to be preoccupations of modern thought.

After an evaluation of this philosophy's merits and defects, he confronts contemporary thought with thomistic philosophy and theology. This latter part of the work, particularly the section on thomistic philosophy, is disappointing. He fails to exploit the concreteness of thomistic thought, and such texts as the following are misleading: "we attain being through perceptual experience, with the help of abstract concepts and by the mediation of reasoning" (p. 151).

One would desire that the latter part of the work had employed more of the themes found in the analysis of contemporary thought; thus, the themes of presence, in-

tentionality, existence and participation could have been used in his exposition of thomism.

The book is valuable as a pioneering work in the direction of a dialogue between existential phenomenology and thomistic thought.

T. J. CRONIN, S.J.
Saint Louis University.

THE NEGRO PROFESSIONAL CLASS.

By G. Franklin Edwards. With a Foreword by Otis Dudley Duncan. Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 224 pp. \$4

Contrary to a common opinion, lightness of skin color is not a factor in the entrance of Negroes into the ranks of the professional class. This is one of a number of interesting conclusions which G. Franklin Edwards, Professor of Sociology at Howard University, arrives at in this book, an outgrowth of his doctoral dissertation at the University of Chicago. The writer examines, in addition to skin color, such factors as region of origin, age, family income and educational level of parents, insofar as these things have a bearing on Negroes becoming professional workers.

The project reported on in this book follows the statistical methodology usual in sociological fact-finding. The sample selected for the study included some 300 male Negroes divided among the professions of physician, dentist, lawyer and college teacher. Negro clergymen were excluded on the grounds that individuals in this group often have little or no professional training and in some instances even little formal education.

What Dr. Edwards discovered about the motivation of Negro professional workers is a little unexpected. According to the respondents' own declarations, it was interest in the particular form of professional work they entered, more than desire for personal gain, that motivated them. The work-interest also outweighed as a motive the desire to render service. Family influence as a reason for entering a profession was strongest among the doctors and dentists. In a large number of cases teachers felt that they were trapped in

their profession, unable to get out of the teaching profession because they had married and assumed family responsibilities.

Perhaps the chief limitation of this study is that it considers Negro professional workers of one city only, Washington, D.C. It seems to this reviewer that not too much significance can be attached to the discovery that the Negro professional class shows greater vertical mobility than white professional workers. When a race has been kept at the bottom of the economic and social ladder as long and consistently as the Negroes have been, the only direction in which they can move, when they begin to move at all, is up. On the other hand, one of the most significant facts this study points up is the marked social and economic stratification that exists among Negroes themselves.

Readers who prefer objective presentation of the Negro situation to social protest will welcome this study. The book is as devoid of emotion as a mathematics text. It contains no hint of suggestion for social action. It confines itself scrupulously to a factual account of the present status of Negro professional workers to the extent that any valid generalizations can be made from the study of a single economic class in a single city.

VINCENT SHEPPARD, O.S.B.
St. Bernard College
Cullman, Alabama

SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT? By Lewis Mayers. Harper, New York. 341 pp. \$5

The author, formerly Professor of Law at the City College of New York, gives us a careful study of the historical development of the privilege against self-incrimination. His conviction is that the needs of law enforcement have been unwisely sacrificed for the protection of the individual. He asserts that the entire privilege against self-incrimination, except for the right of the accused to remain silent at his trial, is rather the handiwork of the courts than that of the Founding Fathers.

What we think of as a single rule of

law has reference to several distinct rules, each having its own independent development. The privilege applies today to the preliminary examination and to the grand jury investigation of the accused. It is now available also to any witness before a grand jury, as well as to a witness in judicial proceedings, and at administrative and legislative investigations.

Thus the federal and state courts over the past hundred years, following the lead of the Supreme Court, have constructed a many-chambered sanctuary. Mr. Mayers believes that the hands that reared this structure have the power to dismantle it. Not by amending the Fifth Amendment, however, for that would be an enormous task. It should be done, he says, by judicial decisions and a piecemeal modification of federal and state laws and even by amending state constitutions and city charters.

He urges that judges, legislators and thoughtful citizens make separate evaluations for each of the several settings in which the privilege operates. His recommendations include:

Rigorous administrative measures to prevent police abuse of suspects, since the privilege has proved ineffective in protecting citizens against mistreatment. Some procedure, however, is required for properly supervised questioning of the suspect as soon as possible after arrest.

The author contends that the right to withhold essential information merely by alleging that its disclosure will tend to incriminate the witness—an allegation usually incapable of verification—may work grave injustice and is indefensible on rational grounds.

Adoption of the Canadian rule which prohibits subsequent use of the witness's testimony against him in a criminal proceeding.

Compulsory testimony of witnesses at legislative inquiries which have as their object the condemnation or exoneration of public officers or of the recipients of public funds or privileges. Further, if the witness holds, or has held, public office, is the holder of a private trust or of a license or contract with a public agency, the testimony could be used by the prosecution in a subsequent criminal proceeding. This goes

beyond the provision of the New York City Charter which requires that any city employee who asserts the privilege against self-incrimination upon being interrogated by an authorized body with respect to his official conduct immediately forfeits his post.

Proponents of civil liberties and those concerned with safeguarding the rights of the individual will not take kindly to this book. They should also consider whether the rules which we call the privilege against self-incrimination are or are not a valuable expression of the forbearance of the state to use its full compulsive power.

THOMAS J. CASEY, S.J.
Weston College
Weston, Mass.

DICTIONARY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE. By John T. Zadzorny. Public Affairs, Washington, D. C. 367 pp. \$6

A READER'S GUIDE TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. Edited by Bert F. Hoselitz. Free Press, Glencoe, Ill. 256 pp. \$6

RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL RELATIONS. By Claire Sellitz, Marie Jahoda, Morton Deutsch, Stuart Cook. Holt, New York. 622 pp. \$5.50

The *Dictionary of Social Science*, compiled for the non-specialist, gives brief and surprisingly competent definition to the more common words and to much of the esoteric references found in semi-popular social science literature.

The reference librarian will, of course, observe that its first entry, "abandoned child," is somewhat obvious, and that the last, "zoomorphism," is equally available in Webster. But he should also note its repertoire of current slang expressions that are neither obvious nor readily available elsewhere.

The second book is a little more difficult to evaluate. Projected as a guide to librarians, it is offered to all "who wish to obtain a general overview of the literature" of history, geography, political science, economics, sociology, anthropology and psychology.

It is not quite clear just what the general reader is to do after he has read the thumb-nail descriptions that make up this

mise en scène of a thousand odd classics and other works which "present certain peculiarities worth discussion." No doubt this will depend on the confidence with which he turns respectively to Professors Hoselitz, Ginsburg, Eulau, Hoselitz, Blau and Moore, Kelly and Reitman.

There is no such problem in finding a use for the third book, *Research Methods in Social Relations*. It is written for the classroom. Readers familiar with the 1951 two-volume version will welcome the news that it has been condensed into a single, clearly-written undergraduate text. "We have tried to clarify the material that was in Volume One," the authors report, "by simplifying the language and by expanding some of the discussion." Much of Volume Two was highly technical. Only those sections, therefore, are retained that they considered relevant to the needs of an undergraduate.

PAUL HILSDALE, S.J.

THE KEYNESIAN THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By Kenneth K. Kurihara. Columbia University Press, New York. 219 pp., \$5.50

With his earlier *Introduction to Keynesian Dynamics* Professor Kurihara of Rutgers established himself as one of the most reliable interpreters of the great British economist. Here he seeks to round out the growth models of such Keynesians as Harrod, Domar, Joan Robinson, Nurkse.

Why is long run growth so precarious and why is short-period equilibrium so unstable? The answer of these Keynesians is that the balance of savings and investment is disturbed by growth—haphazard growth—of the supply of capital, and hence of the capacity to produce. In the developed countries the result is a capacity to produce outgrowing effective demand with deflationary consequence. In the underdeveloped areas, on the other hand, capacity grows much more slowly than demand with consequent inflationary tendencies. How then can effective demand be brought into balance with growing capacity? According to the Keynesian formula, policy for the developed nation should concentrate on

speeding up growth of income to take away the growing product whereas in the undeveloped country capacity to produce should be rapidly increased. This will overcome inflation, but, more important, it will curb unemployment.

Here, however, we are confronted with another required equilibrium: the rate of productive capacity must also be in balance with the rate of population growth coupled with its rate of growth of productivity.

With this growth model (here presented in non-technical form) it is clear to Professor Kurihara that, if the undeveloped nations are not to live always under the fear of effective demand outstripping or falling behind productive capacity, they cannot rely on unguided market forces, the accidents of profit-motivated innovation, *laissez-faire* savings and investment. The social philosophy of Keynes must be much more forthrightly espoused. Besides the role ascribed to the state in guiding effective demand, the government must play a far more decisive role in directing the growth of productive capacity. Only in this way can the underdeveloped nations hope for the external economies which so increase productive capacity while encouraging private enterprisers. Only thus, too, can they hope for a measure of stability in investment.

Readers of Professor Kurihara's volume will find that, despite the frequently mathematical treatment of the argument, the model unfolds simply and clearly. One could not fairly expect anything startlingly new in a field to which the present author has already made his contributions. However, there is no single volume in which one can better learn what growth economics, as applied to undeveloped countries, is all about.

PHILIP LAND, S.J.
Gregorian University
Rome

**FEDERAL BUDGET AND FISCAL POLICY
1789-1958.** By Lewis H. Kimmel. Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C. 337 pp. \$5

Are Benjamin Franklin's homely teachings on thrift, Emerson's doctrine of the free

individual or Thoreau's boundless contempt of the State out-of-date today? Certainly with the Federal debt pushing onward and upward to new heights, it is apparent that many Americans would no longer place thrift and self-reliance in a list of life's most important virtues. What caused this change?

In this interesting book, Mr. Kimmel sets out to describe and analyze the breakdown and undermining of the rigid orthodoxy that government costs were to be held down, budgets were to be balanced and federal debts were to be reduced. He traces the emergence of the new conception of fiscal policy which holds that federal spending programs should be used to promote full employment, high-level production and balanced growth with consumption and capital formation interacting upon each other. For an excellent background understanding of current budget and fiscal policies, this book is recommended.

FRANCIS J. CORRIGAN
Saint Louis University

THE NEW INFLATION. By Willard Thorp and Richard E. Quandt. McGraw-Hill, New York. xi, 233 pp. \$5

This book is less a study of the "new inflation" itself than a complete, brief manual of all economic theory and analysis of inflation, "new" or "old". It is an outgrowth of the Sessions on Inflation held at the Merrill Center for Economics, July 7-18, 1958. There these authors had the opportunity to pick the brains of the other 21 conferees as well as the materials published by the Joint Economic Committee of Congress (to which they make grateful acknowledgment).

This is a short book, both in number of pages and words to the page; yet it would be difficult to claim that any worthwhile consideration or point of view has not been adequately defined and discussed. The treatment is easy and on a level quite comprehensive to anyone of ordinary economic literacy.

The authors do not take sides in fixing the blame for the "new inflation". As they correctly point out, inflationary forces act

and interact in a cumulative process. The problem is something like the proverbial "chicken or egg" sequence. What is important, at least for economic inquiry at this point, is a pinpointing of factors involved and of their timing.

During the 1950s two different authors, Richard Lindholm and James Maxwell, came out with good short treatments of fiscal policy designed for supplementary classroom reading. The publishers will be missing a good market if they do not push this work as a standard reserved shelf item for undergraduate courses. The topic is most timely and the book most apt. It would help, however, to reduce the price, and even to get out a paperback edition!

RICHARD L. PORTER, S.J.
The Creighton University
Omaha, Neb.

DRINKING AND INTOXICATION: Selected Readings in Social Attitudes and Controls. Edited by Raymond G. McCarthy. Yale Center of Alcohol Studies,

New Haven, and The Free Press, Glencoe (Illinois). 455 pp. \$7.50

This series of readings on alcohol and its problems is gathered under the following headings: Physiological and Psychological Effects of Alcohol; Drinking Practices, Ancient and Modern; Drinking Practices, U. S. A.; Cultural, Religious, and Ethical Factors; Controls. Much of the material is informative, some of it highly interesting. It is valuable as a reference work which should be on the shelves of all general libraries and of alcohol information centers.

The section on religious factors is weak. One would expect in a work of this kind to find a more adequate presentation of the traditional Catholic position with regard to the use and abuse of alcohol, and of the Catholic total abstinence movements of the last century.

The book will provide excellent supplementary reading for students at the Yale School of Alcohol Studies, and other similar courses, but the price will put it beyond the reach of most readers.

Letters

Appeals

This letter comes to you from the Rector of the Sacred Heart Seminary, a Major seminary with 100 seminarians studying for 22 various mission dioceses of India.

Recently I came across your publication *SOCIAL ORDER*. We would like very much to have this beautiful review for our Reading room and library. You can be assured that our seminarians will make good use of it. You know that it is impossible for a mission seminary like ours to subscribe for all the magazines and Reviews that we are in need of. So I request you kindly to send it as a gift subscription to us.

(REV.) C. MAURI

Poonamallee
Chingleput Dt.
South India

I am a missionary in charge, among other things, of a grade school which I am trying to raise into the first High School of my large missionary district. In point of fact, I am just now up to my neck in worries, over the building which is coming up to house it.

In several places I have seen your fine publication and have been wishing for a long time to be a regular subscriber. Lack of means, however, and the difficulty in sending money abroad, have thus far prevented me.

I am wondering if, among your readers, there might be someone willing to subscribe for me or, failing that, to send me their copy, once they have finished with it.

(REV.) M. A. TOGNOCCHI, S.D.B.

Marianhill
Jowai P.O. [Assam] India

I shall be grateful if you will "light one candle" for us to dispel the great darkness in this land of India by inserting a few lines in your valuable magazine appealing for donation of books and Catholic magazines for distribution among the schools, hospitals, and jails of this country.

For this purpose, our All India Missionary Seminary has founded a Centre for the Propaganda of Good Literature and has made some progress during the two years of its existence, as the enclosed leaflet will show. Our ambition is to do more, especially when the communists are flooding the country with poisonous literature and corrupting the religious-minded albeit pagan people of this great land.

SERGIO MASCARENHAS, S.F.X.

All India Mission
Seminary
Pillar, Goa, India

Similar requests for gift subscriptions arrive regularly from what have been aptly termed "Areas of Rapid Social Change." Contributions for this purpose are gladly welcomed.—Ed.

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"Police-Community Relations"

In his recent article, "Police-Community Relations," Louis Radelet provides a useful account of a movement which needs continuing encouragement. His own efforts have had much to do with the development he describes, as I have learned through contacts with a local police academy in recent months. Perhaps the cause could be assisted if ways were found to increase police participation in neighborhood and community projects. The sensitivity and defensiveness of some officers are in part products of a feeling of isolation and of negative role definitions which assume necessary conflict with such professional groups as social workers. The fallacies of prevailing stereotypes can be revealed in discussions but not nearly so effectively as in the experience of joint action for appropriate common goals.

G. J. NUESSE

Dean, School of Social Science
The Catholic University of America
Washington, D. C.

Doctor Radelet's article in your May issue has provided us with a valuable and perceptive summary of the efforts which have been made in recent years to improve police-community relations. His work through the National Conference of Christians and Jews has been one of the prime influences in this growing movement. What has been done, however, is only a small fraction of the need, in view of our rapidly growing and highly mobile urban population with so many migrants from parts of the country in which the law enforcement officer has been one of the chief symbols and instruments of racial segregation and discrimination. Projects like the School of Police Administration at Michigan State should be multiplied many times to encourage both the professionalization of police and the development of a full understanding of the human factors which must be a basic part of sound police-community relations.

ALEXANDER J. ALLEN

Director of Special Projects
National Urban League
New York, N. Y.

SOCIAL EDUCATION FOR PRIESTS IN ROME

Ten years ago there occurred in Rome what was for its world of ecclesiastical studies something of a revolution. The Jesuits' Gregorian University abandoned its exclusive concentration on the "sacred" sciences to open its doors to the social sciences. Four hundred years separates the fledgling entry from the Gregorian's first two faculties—those of philosophy and theology—founded in the old Roman college in 1553.

What brought the Jesuits to undertake the new work was a growing awareness of the need to provide at Rome a social science program combining solid offerings in the social sciences with a time-tested emphasis on Catholic social philosophy. With an eye to the rich diversity of socio-economic and cultural background of its students (84 nations are represented in its student body), the university has weighed the experience of the Institute's first ten years and finally come up with what seems to fill the bill.

Students, no matter what their future work will be—teaching or engaging in direct social action—now find courses suited to their need within their particular national background. Hitherto they all took the same course. Now they may specialize in either economics or sociology. In either case there will be no neglect of the other social sciences nor of continuing heavy emphasis upon Catholic social thought.

A doctorate is now offered in religious sociology to meet the growing demand in that sector. Those seeking aid in their country's fight against Communist subversion find an attractive array of courses on Marxist economics and philosophy. Increased interest in economic development of backward areas has led to a fuller program on the economics of development. While providing place for a considerable amount of specialization in either economics or sociology, the Institute does not offer a degree in either. Its degrees—B.A., M.A., and Ph.D.—are degrees of "the social sciences."

Some 20 Jesuit priests make up the staff. Coming as they do from eight different nations where they have received their specialized training, these social educators bring to the Gregorian representation from a number of well-known European and American universities. Four American Jesuits are on the staff. Students from English-speaking nations find themselves at ease, since practically all their teachers speak English.

The Institute has a growing collection of published dissertations which have been favorably received by critics. These include studies of the European Common Market, religious surveys of parish or diocese, aspects of Catholic theory of wages and of money, developments in trade unionism, cooperatives and land reform.

Though only ten years old, the Institute has received heartening encouragement from bishops in various parts of the world. These speak with high regard of the services rendered by the Institute's graduates in the staffing of seminaries, Catholic universities and social centers.

Inquiries about the Institute should be addressed to the Rev. Louis Sanschagrin, S.J., Secretary of the Gregorian University, Piazza della Pilotta 4, Rome, Italy.

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